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Tutkimuksen tarkoitus
Viimeisen kahdenkymmenen vuoden aikana Kiina on kivunnut toiseksi eniten ulkomaisia 
investointeja saavien maiden listalla. Myös Kiinaan tehtyjen ulkomaisten investointien 
rakenne on muuttunut huomattavasti. Kun vielä 1980-luvun loppupuolella ja 1990-luvu 
alussa suurin osa ulkomaisista investoinneista Kiinaan tehtiin yhteisyritysten muodossa, 
nykyään ulkomaiset yritykset perustavat yhteis-yritysten sijaan omia tytäryhtiöitä.
Tässä tutkimuksessa pyritään selvittämään miksi ulkomaisten investointien rakenne Kiinassa 
on muuttunut. Erityisesti keskitytään siihen miten toimintaympäristön muutokset Kiinassa 
ovat vaikuttaneet ja vaikuttavat nykyään yritysmuodon valintaan. Kysymystä tarkastellaan 
sekä kirjallisuuden pohjalta, että kuuden esimerkkiyrityksen kautta.
Teoreettinen viitekehys
Tutkimuksen teoreettisessa osassa käydään läpi ulkomaisiin investointeihin ja yritys- tai 
toimintamuodon valintaan liittyvää teoriaa. Erityisesti keskitytään kysymykseen mitkä tekijät 
vaikuttavat valintaan tytäryhtiön ja yhteisyrityksen välillä. Kysymystä tarkastellaan sekä 
kansainvälistymisteorian, transaction cost teorian, että bargaining power teorian pohjalta. 
Toisessa osassa teoreettiseen viitekehykseen tuodaan mukaan myös Kiinan toimintaympäristö 
ja sen vaikutukset.
Case-esimerkit
Tutkimus perustuu kirjallisuuskatsaukseen ja kuuteen case-esimerkkiin. Mukana olevat kuusi 
casea ovat kertomuksia suomalaisten yritysten kokonaanomisteisista tytäryhtiöistä Kiinassa, 
ja siitä miten nämä yritykset päätyivät perustamaan juuri oman tytäryhtiön aikaisemmin 
suositun yhteisyrityksen sijaan. Case-yritykset ovat: Neste Kunshan, Shanghai Thermo 
Labsystems, Wecan Electronics Suzhou, Metso Minerals Tianjin, Guangzhou Novo 
Technology Development ja Kaukomarkkinat.
Tärkeimmät tulokset
Tärkein syy ulkomaisten tytäryhtiöiden yleistymiseen ja yhteisyritysten vähentymiseen 
Kiinassa on se, että ulkomaisia yrityksiä koskeva lainsäädäntö on muuttunut vuosien mittaan 
sallivammaksi. Ulkomaisilla yrityksillä on nykyään myös enemmän kokemusta Kiinasta, ja 
siksi Kiinalaista partneria ja monesti hankalaa yhteisyritys-muotoa ei nähdä enää 
välttämättömänä.
Asiasanat: Kiina, ulkomaiset investoinnit, tytäryhtiöt, yhteisyritykset
1
ABSTRACT
Purpose of the study
During the past twenty years China has become the second largest recipient of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in the world. The structure of FDI has also changed enormously. While still 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s nearly all FDI was made through joint ventures, nowadays 
most foreign investors are investing in China without Chinese partners through wholly owned 
subsidiaries.
This study is designated to explore the foreign direct investment environment in China. And 
more particularly, to understand the change that has happened as more and more foreign 
investors are establishing wholly owned subsidiaries instead of the traditional Chinese- 
foreign joint ventures.
Theoretical Framework
In the theoretical part of this study foreign direct investment and entry mode literature is 
explored to understand how foreign investors choose between joint venture and wholly owned 
subsidia^ modes. Both internationalization and transaction cost views are explored, as well 
as bargaining power theory.
The understanding derived from these theories is then combined with what is known about 
China as a business environment to explain why the structure of FDI into China has changed 
during the past years, and why the WFOE is becoming a more popular entry mode option.
Cases
The research was conducted by using desk research and a multiple case study method. The 
cases include descriptions of six Finnish wholly owned subsidiaries in China and their entry 
mode decisions. The companies are: Neste Kunshan, Shanghai ThermoLabsystems, Wecan 
Electronics Suzhou, Metso Minerals Tianjin, Guangzhou Novo Technology Development 
and Kaukomarkkinat.
Major Findings
The most important reason for the increase of wholly owned subsidiaries and the decrease of 
joint ventures in China is the changes in legislation and the more permissive foreign 
investment policy. Foreign companies have also gained experience of China, and thus do not 
necessarily need a Chinese partner and the difficult joint venture form anymore.
Key Words: China, foreign direct investment, wholly owned subsidiaries, joint ventures, entry mode
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
After being a closed economy for decades, in 1979 Peoples Republic of China chose the open 
door policy to develop its economy and industries. Open door policy was adopted because the 
Chinese government believed it could acquire four items that the country desperately needed: 
capital, high technology, advanced management know-how and access to international markets.
Since the opening, foreign direct investment (FDI) into China has grown drastically. The 
growth of FDI has been especially fast since 1992, when Deng Xiaoping's government adopted 
the "socialist market economy" doctrine and sped up market-oriented reforms. By 1995 the 
inflow of FDI into China already ranked the second highest in the world, only behind the USA. 
In 2001 the inflow of FDI into China accounted $46 billion.
The foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) have played a major role in the modernization of the 
Chinese economy. The share of total industrial output in China made by the FIEs reached 
18.6% in 1997. Also, FIEs share of the total national export volume was 41% and they 
employed 17.5 million Chinese. (UNCTAD, 1998) See also Appendix 1.
Table 1-1: Foreign Direct Investment into China 1979-2001
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Sources: China Statistical Yearbooks 1989-2000, China Monthly Economic Indicators 2001/8 and MOFTEC
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Although China opened for foreign investment already over twenty years ago, the subject of 
FDI in China is still interesting and very timely. The investment environment in China has
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changed enormously over the past twenty years, and more is to come as China is joined the 
WTO in 2001. According to Luo (2000, 26) China is now entering the more difficult phase of 
its reforms, that of developing the legal, administrative and regulatory framework that supports 
a modem economy. Until this is complete, China will be a challenging and sometimes difficult 
environment for foreign firms. Yet China continues to attract foreign companies. Not 
surprising, as China is not only a source of cheap labour, but unlike many other developing 
countries China is the world's largest emerging market.
This study is designated to explore the foreign direct investment environment in China. And 
more particularly, to understand the change that has happened as more and more foreign 
investors are establishing wholly owned subsidiaries instead of the traditional Chinese-foreign 
joint ventures.
1.1.1 Foreign Direct Investment Forms in China
The choice of entry modes into China has expanded in the recent years. Entry modes available 
to international trading businesses include conventional import and export, flexible trade (i.e., 
processing imported materials or foreign samples and assembling imported parts and 
components), international leasing and counter-trade (Luo 2001).
For foreign direct investors the Chinese government has classified the following modes of 
entry: (1) contractual (or cooperative) joint venture, (2) equity joint venture and (3) wholly 
foreign owned enterprise. In addition, foreign companies can invest in China through joint 
exploration projects (e g. oil exploration projects), whose significance to the total FDI in China 
is however marginal. (See e g. Luo 2000)
Equity joint venture (EJV) (hezi give):
By definition, equity joint venture (EJV) is a limited liability corporation between Chinese and 
foreign partner(s). An EJV has a legal person status. The most important legislation governing 
the EJVs is “Law on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment” (1979) and 
“Implementing regulations” (1983 and 2001).
In EJV the equity split is determined by the proportions of partner's contributions. Foreign 
partner(s) must contribute at least 25 % of the venture's registered capital. Contributions can 
take the form of cash (foreign currency or renminbi), land-use rights, buildings, equipment,
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materials, intellectual property, or labour. In a typical EJV in China, the Chinese partner 
contributes land, labour, raw materials and production facilities, but seldom cash equity or 
operating capital. The foreign partner is often expected to provide the technology, capital 
equipment and machinen-, management, access to world market, and possibly additional 
working capital beyond a financial equity contribution. (Pan et al., 1995, 126) The EJV is 
usually managed jointly - under the direction of a board of directors, generally selected by the 
investors in proportion to their respective share of equity investment. (Kaiser et al., 1996, 46) 
Risks, profits and losses are allocated in proportion to contributions.
Contractual Joint Venture (CJV) (hezuo give):
In addition to the equity joint venture, the Chinese law defines also another kind of joint 
venture form. Contractual joint venture (CJV) is a contractual partnership between Chinese 
and other foreign partner(s). The CJV subsumes a variety of arrangements whereby the 
Chinese and foreign partner(s) cooperate in joint projects and business activities according to 
the terms and conditions stipulated in a venture agreement. In contrast to the EJV, the CJV 
does not necessarily require the creation of a new legal entity. The CJV can take any form of 
agreement and provides, therefore, more flexibility- in negotiation than the EJV. (Kaiser et al., 
1996, 47)
As in EJVs, also in CJVs foreign partners must contribute at least 25 percent of the venture's 
registered capital. Contributions can be in a variety of forms, including cash (foreign currency 
or renminbi), land-use rights, buildings, equipment, materials, and intellectual property. The 
most important legislation concerning the CJVs is: “Sino-Foreign Cooperative Contractual 
Joint Venture Law” (1988), and “Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture Law Implementing 
Rules” (1995 and 2001).
Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise (WFOE) (waizi duzi give):
By definition wholly foreign owned enterprise (WFOE) is a company solely owned and 
operated by a foreign investor or investors, who bear all risks and receive all profits. WFOEs 
are organized as a limited liability companies. They have a legal person status, and can own, 
use and dispose of property; can carry out management and production activities 
independently. Earlier a WFOE had to export 50 percent of its output or qualify as a high 
technology enterprise. However, in 2001 these requirements were removed.
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The major legislation concerning the WFOEs is: “PRC Law Concerning Enterprises with Sole 
Foreign Investment"’ (1986) and “Implementing regulations” (1990 and 2001).
Other Investment Vehicles
In addition to the EJV, CJV and WFOE, foreign investors can establish representative or 
branch offices. During the late 1990's the Chinese policymakers have also introduced new 
investment vehicles (foreign-invested share company and holding company), and enacted new 
legislation (e.g. the regulations on mergers and acquisitions). These are introduced briefly 
below.
Although technically not considered a foreign-invested enterprise, a representative office (dai 
biao chu) is a quick and relatively simple way to become acquainted with the China market 
and thus a popular first step for new entrants to China. Representative offices allow firms to 
establish contacts with key industrial ministries and begin to build their company's reputation 
in China. By law, representative offices are prohibited from engaging in direct, profit-making 
business activity in the PRC, but are allowed to undertake non-commercial activities - 
including business communication, product promotion, market research, contract 
administration and negotiations on behalf of the head office.
The branch office (fen gongsi) is a relatively new alternative for the traditional representative 
office. However, at the moment only a few service sectors, such as law and banking, have been 
given branching rights. The US-China WTO agreement mentions that branching rights will be 
dealt with in an upcoming PRC law. Thus the future utility of branches depends on how the 
PRC policymakers will adapt Chinese laws concerning branch offices.
For a long time foreign investors suffered from the limitations of China’s rigid FDI structures. 
For example, it was very difficult or impossible to combine multiple operations under one roof, 
or restructure inefficient JVs. In the late 1990’s it became possible to establish holding or 
investment companies (konggu gongsi) that allow foreign companies with several 
investments in China to combine sales, procurement, subsidiary investment, manufacturing and 
service activities. By the end of 1999, Chinese authorities had approved more than 180 holding 
companies (Sutter, 2000).
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Another advancement in the FDI regulation that facilitates the consolidation of foreign 
companies operations in China was the issue of "The Regulations on the Merger and Division 
of Foreign Invested Enterprises” in 1999. Most of the merger and acquisition activity involving 
foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) to date has involved either the sale of one FIEs equity 
interest in a venture to another FIE, or the buy-out of a Chinese partner (Sutter, 2000).
And lastly, the foreign-invested share company (FISC) or limited company (gu fen you 
xian gongsi) is a hybrid investment vehicle that combines elements of the traditional joint 
venture and the Chinese joint-stock limited liability company. Limited companies raise capital 
by issuing shares and can be listed on the PRC stock exchanges. However, although the law on 
FISCs was passed already in 1994, the FISC is still very much experimental and it's use has 
also been small due to its feasibility only for companies making very large investments in 
China.
1.1.2 The Structure of FDI in China
The first step of the open door policy was the promulgation of the law on foreign joint ventures 
in 1979. This law made it possible for foreign enterprises to enter China by establishing joint 
ventures with Chinese companies. "The Law on Enterprises Operated Exclusively with Foreign 
Capital”, that made wholly foreign owned enterprises (WFOE) possible came later in 1986.
Table 1-2: Number of Contracted FIEs by Type 1988-2001
Equity Joint 
Ventures
number %
Contractual Joint 
Ventures
number %
Wholly foreign 
owned enterprises
number %
Other
1988 3909 65.8 1621 27.3 410 6.9 5
1989 3659 63.3 1179 20.4 931 16.1 10
1990 4091 56.2 1317 18.1 1860 25.6 5
1991 8395 64.7 1778 13.7 2795 21,5 10
1992 34354 70.4 5711 11.7 8692 17.8 7
1993 54003 64.7 10445 12.5 18975 22.7 14
1994 27890 58.7 6634 14,0 13007 27.4 18
1995 20455 55.3 4787 12.9 11761 31.8 8
1996 12628 51.4 2849 11.6 9062 36.9 17
1997 9001 42.9 2373 11.3 9602 45.7 25
1998 8107 40.9 2003 10.1 9673 48.9 16
1999 7050 41.7 1656 9,8 8201 48.5 11
2000 8378 37.5 1757 7.9 12196 54,6 16
2001 (Jan- 
Jul.)
5653 34.6 1031 6,3 9650 59.0 10
Adapted from China Statistical Yearbooks 1989-2000 and China Statistical Abstract 2001.
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Until quite recently the equity joint venture was the most common investment vehicle used by 
foreign investors. Between 1979 and June 2000, foreign companies entered into 201,848 equity 
joint venture contracts (Sutter, 2000). However, in the 1990's the share of wholly foreign 
owned enterprises has been increasing considerably. While in 1990 only 12% of all foreign- 
funded enterprises approved up to then were WFOEs, in 1997, WFOEs surpassed equity joint 
ventures as the most popular foreign investment vehicle. Between 1979 and June 2000, foreign 
firms signed 100,624 WFOE contracts. (Sutter, 2000)
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS
Since the opening of China there has been a lot of research on EDI operations in China. 
Especially management of Sino-foreign JVs has been studied widely (see e.g. Ali-Yrkkö et al. 
1999, Beamish 1993, Hamill and Pamblos 1996, Kaukonen 1994, Martinson and Tseng 1995, 
Pan et al. 1995, Shenkar 1990, Wong et al. 1999, Zee and Ho 1994). Several case studies also 
exist on Finnish joint venture companies in China (see e.g. Ali-Yrkkö et al. 1999, Kaukonen 
1995, Al-Obaidi 1999, Suonperä 1999 and Sipilä 1996). Sino-foreign JVs tend to dominate the 
academic research and literature written on doing business in China, while so far WFOEs have 
received very little attention. Most of the books on doing business in China concentrate on JV 
management whereas WFOEs are only briefly covered.
Luo (2000a) has studied entry mode selection in China and his work also contains many case 
studies of western wholly owned subsidiaries in China. Finnish wholly owned subsidiaries have 
not been studied before from the entry mode selection perspective, excluding one short case 
description in Ali-Yrkkö at al. (1999).
Earlier, the general opinion seemed to be that although Sino-foreign joint ventures are 
troublesome and hard to manage even in stable environments, a JV is the "best - indeed the 
only"’ way to enter China (Vanhonacker 1997). However, as the regulatory and business 
environment in China is evolving more and more western companies are choosing the WFOE 
instead of the "conventional" JV. The objective of this study is to understand how the 
environment in China affects entry mode decisions. Especially, which factors are important 
when considering the WFOE as an entry mode?
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Research Questions:
Question 1: Why has the structure of FDI into China changed during the past years?
Why is the WFOE becoming a more popular entry mode option?
Question 2: What kind of Finnish companies have established WFOEs in China? Why
did they choose the WFOE mode?
The research question #1 aims to study the phenomenon of increasing number of WFOEs on a 
macro level. The question is discussed in chapters 2 and 3 based on existing literature, and 
developed into a theoretical framework for the empirical part of this research. The research 
question #2 is tackled in the empirical part of the study (chapters 4 and 5) by using a multiple 
case study method. The purpose of the case studies is to illustrate the phenomenon of 
increasing number of WFOEs and the reasons behind it, not to study the companies 
themselves. The emphasis is on the history and what has happened. This study does not try to 
predict the future.
1.3 LIMITATIONS
The focus of this study is on wholly foreign owned subsidiaries (WOS) in China. When 
discussing the operation mode choice the WOSs are mainly compared against the other foreign 
investment alternative - joint ventures. Other operation modes such as exporting and licensing 
are not considered. Secondly, although there are some other forms of foreign direct investment 
(such as joint exploration projects) in China, their significance to total FDI is marginal. For the 
vast majority of companies the foreign investment options in China are wholly owned 
subsidiaries and joint ventures. Thus the question in this study is whether to invest in China 
alone or with a partner.
Thirdly, the question of acquisition vs. greenfield investment is not given great attention, as the 
focus of this study is, as mentioned, whether to have a local partner or not. Most wholly 
foreign owned subsidiaries in China are greenfield investments, though some have been formed 
by buying out the Chinese partner in a joint venture.
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Fourthly, this study concentrates on business operations in mainland China. Although Hong 
Kong was returned to China in 1997 and Macao in 1999, they maintain a Special 
Administrative Region (SAR) status, and can be considered almost as separate countries. Thus 
any of the investment legislation in China or the phenomenon of changing investment structure 
does not concern them. Foreign companies have for decades used Hong Kong as a bridgehead 
to China and thus Hong Kong is an important part of their China strategies. However, wholly 
owned subsidiaries in Hong Kong are not included in this study.
1.4 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Definitions
Entry/investment mode:
An institutional arrangement for organizing and conducting international business 
transactions, such as contractual transfers, joint ventures and wholly owned 
operations (Root, 1987). In this study, this term is mostly used to refer to direct 
investment modes. Also, the term entry/investment mode is used to refer not only 
to the first entry to the country, but also to all following investments.
Foreign direct investment, FDI:
Foreign direct investments are investments in an already existing company 
(acquisition) or in a company to be established (greenfield) abroad, in whose 
management and control the investor is participating on the basis of the 
investment made (Luostarinen and Welch 1994).
Joint venture, JV :
The term joint venture has two major meanings: (1) equity joint venture, and (2) 
contractual joint venture (Luostarinen and Welch 1994). In this study the term 
joint venture is used mostly to refer to equity joint ventures. A (equity) joint 
venture is a company whose ownership and control are shared between two parent 
companies (Root 1987). In the context of this study, these partners are a foreign 
(Finnish) investor and a local (Chinese) partner.
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Wholly owned subsidiary, WOS:
Wholly owned subsidian' is a subsidiary, which is fully owned by the mother firm 
(Luostarinen and Welch 1994), in the context of this study a foreign (Finnish) 
investor.
Abbreviations
CIV: Contractual Joint Venture / Cooperative Joint Venture. Chinese term: hezuo qiye.
EJV: Equity Joint Venture. Chinese term: hezi qiye.
FIE: Foreign Invested Enterprise, a term used by Chinese government to refer to all
foreign invested companies: equity joint ventures (EJV), contractual joint ventures 
(CJV) and wholly foreign owned enterprises (WFOE).
FISC Foreign-Invested Share Company
IPR Intellectual Property Rights
LDC Less developed country
MOFTEC: China's Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation.
PRC People's Republic of China
RMB Renminbi, “The People’s Currency”, the Chinese Yuan 
SEZ Special Economic Zone
Sino: China, Chinese, (sinology = study of China)
SOE State Owned Enterprise
WFOE Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise. Sometimes also referred to as WOFE (wholly 
owned foreign enterprise). A form of enterprise, defined in the Chinese law that is 
solely owned and operated by a foreign investor or investors. Chinese term: waizi 
chizi qiye.
WOS Wholly Owned Subsidiary. WOS is a term used in general business literature.
The meaning of WOS is the same as the meaning of WFOE, that is the term used 
in Chinese law.
WTO World Trade Organization
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1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY
The study begins with a literature review in chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 discusses the theories 
of entry mode selection, while chapter 3 concentrates on the investment environment in China.
Chapter 2 first present factors affecting a company's entry mode choice and then discusses 
several different theories and frameworks explaining it. These are divided into three main 
paragraphs: internationalization model, transaction cost perspective and bargaining power 
framework. In chapter 3 the research question 1 (Why has the structure of FDI into China 
changed during the past years? Why are WFOEs becoming a more popular entry mode 
option?) is tackled. This chapter discusses the effects of Chinese government policy and the 
challenging business environment in China. Finally, the last sub-chapter (3.3) presents the 
framework for the empirical part of this study that attempts to combine both the theoretical 
perspective of entry mode choice discussed in chapter 2 and the aspects of China as investment 
environment discussed in chapter 3.
Chapter 4 presents the methodology used in the empirical research. Chapter 5 presents the 
empirical finding of this study. The chapter first introduces the six case companies, their 
operations in China and the reasons why they selected the wholly owned subsidiary mode. 
After the case descriptions follows a discussion where the most important factors are 
identified, and the six cases are compared against each other and against the theory.
Lastly, chapter 6 summarizes the study and its mam findings, draws conclusions and gives 
managerial recommendations and suggestions for further research.
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2 METHODOLOGY
2.1 SELECTION OF APPROACH
The objective of this study is to describe the environment in which foreign direct investment 
occurs in China, and to understand why more and more foreign companies are choosing the 
wholly owned subsidiary as their entry mode. The unit of analysis for this study is the entry 
mode choice and the context of the study is Finnish companies in China. The phenomenon 
under scrutiny is the increasing number of wholly owned foreign subsidiaries in China.
A major part of this study consists of the literature review. The existing literature on foreign 
direct investment in China is plentiful, and provides a major source of evidence. The second 
part of this study consists of multiple case studies. The cases are used as examples for 
highlighting the phenomenon of increasing numbers of wholly owned subsidiaries and 
understanding the reasons behind it. Thus, the case descriptions are rather short and do not try 
to address all aspects of the companies. The data collected was qualitative in nature, and the 
approach in the cases is both descriptive and explanatory.
The case study approach was chosen firstly because, for example according to Yin (1989, 13), 
a case study strategy is a natural choice when a “how"’ and/or a "why’’ research questions are 
asked about contemperar)' set of events, over which the investigator has little or no control. 
Secondly, the complexity of the phenomenon and the need for in depth knowledge, that could 
not have been obtained through a survey called for a case method. In addition, the choice of a 
case method was also motivated by the researcher’s want to collect information on real-life 
practical experiences, that could be useful to other companies when considering their options in 
China.
Naturally, there are some negative aspects in using the case study method. These include 
overly complex or narrow and inimitable theory (Eisenhardt 1989, 547), lack of rigor in 
research, insufficient basis for scientific generalization, and massive, tedious reports (Yin 
1989, 21). Another weakness of the case-study method is the increased subjectivity of the 
results. According to Yin (1989, 21) these problems can be avoided by meticulous case-study 
design that reduces the threat of ambivalent evidence influencing conclusions, and by 
generalizing theories in an analytical, not statistical way. Researcher should also try to 
maintain objectivity during both data collection and data analysis.
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2.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION
The research design of this study is based on Yin’s (1989) and Eisenhardt's (1989) literature
on case study methodology.
1. Literature was reviewed on entry mode theories, foreign direct investment and investment 
environment in China.
2. Based on the literature reviewed, a conceptual framework was developed.
3. Information was gathered from the following sources to select the case companies:
a. Finpro - The Foreign Trade Association, especially the Shanghai office.
b. Economic and business newspapers, magazines and the Internet
c. Managers, who are familiar with Finnish companies" business in China
4. The case companies were selected. An ideal number of cases in this type of a study would 
be 4-10. Less than four cases would not yield very convincing results, while more than 10 
cases would result in overwhelming volume of data. While the total number of Finnish 
wholly owned subsidiaries in China is around 20 (Kaislaniemi 2002), six companies were 
selected for the case studies. They are Finnish companies who have a wholly owned 
subsidiary in China (Wecan Electronics, Novo Group, ThermoLabsystems and Metso), 
have had a wholly owned subsidian- (Neste Kunshan - the former subsidiary- of 
Neste/Fortum), or are planning to establish a wholly owned subsidiary (Kaukomarkkinat). 
The case companies were selected so that they would represent very different kind of 
stories of entry mode choice:
a. Neste Kunshan (polyester paints) was the first Finnish wholly owned subsidiary 
and also Neste Chemical’s first investment in China. For a long time Neste 
negotiated with a potential JV partner, but at the last moment decided to invest 
alone.
b. Wecan Electronics (electronics contract manufacturer) represents companies who 
have followed their customer (Nokia) to China without having any previous 
experience themselves.
c. Novo Group is an IT company that has both a joint venture and a wholly owned 
subsidiary' in China.
d. Shanghai ThermoLabsystems (pipettes and medical instruments) is a classical case 
of a company who started its operations in China as a joint venture but ended up
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in problems with the Chinese partner. After a few years the company was 
successfully changed into a wholly owned subsidiary.
e. Kaukomarkkinat is a trading house with 50 years of experience of doing business 
in China. Kaukomarkkinat 's story is closely related to China's WTO membership 
and the trading business opening to foreign companies.
f. Metso is one of the largest Finnish companies in China, with very broad and long 
experience. Metso (at that time Valmet) established the first Finnish JV in China, 
Valmet Xian. At the moment Metso has 2 JVs, 3 WFOEs, 10 representative 
offices and 1 technology and service center in China.
5. The data collection included the following stages:
a. Information on the case companies was gathered from general sources such as 
annual reports, magazines, newspapers, Internet home pages, seminar 
presentations and earlier case studies written about the companies.
b. Suitable interviewees were searched. The interviewees were managers in the group 
or the subsidiary in China, who were involved in making the investment (and entry 
mode) decision, and/or have been involved in the management of the subsidiary. 1- 
2 managers were interviewed for each case study.
c. General case study questions were drafted based on the preliminary understanding 
of the literature. The case study questions were also reviewed together with a 
senior consultant Ilpo Kaislaniemi at Finpro. The interview questions were refined 
and adapted for each interview according to the available information. The rough 
outline of interview questions is presented in Appendix 2.
d. Semi-structured interviews (see list of interviews in "References') were conducted 
in Finland in April-August of 2002. A basic outline of questions was used in all 
interviews, but the interviewees were allowed to speak freely and were also 
encouraged to talk about issues that they felt were important for the understanding 
of the subject. The emphasis was on understanding the ‘"why” aspect of each 
companies entry mode decision. All interviews were conducted in Finnish, which is 
the native language of both the interviewer and the interviewees. The direct quotes 
that appear in the cases have been translated into English by the author. The 
interviews lasted 1-2 hours and they were all tape-recorded for better validity.
e. The description of the factors affecting each case companies entry mode choice 
was written based on the collected data.
f. The resulting case descriptions were sent to the interviewees for comments.
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2.3 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY
According to Yin (1989) a case study investigator has to consider four aspects of the quality of 
the case study design: construct validity, internal validity (only for causal studies), external 
validity and reliability.
Construct validity of a study means in short that the operational measures chosen to investigate 
the phenomenon really measure what they are supposed to, i.e. the object of the study and not 
another phenomenon. In this study data was gathered from multiple sources. First, theoretical 
literature was reviewed to find factors affecting entry mode choices. Then, literature on FDI 
and business in China were reviewed to find the factors most relevant in case of China. Finally, 
six case studies were made to give real life examples.
In qualitative research internal validity is a measure of whether the researchers description of 
the phenomenon is truthful, and whether causal relationships and conclusions are right (Miles 
and Huberman 1994). For the research question #1 ("why has the structure of FDI into China 
changed during the past years?”) the evidence is strong and thus the conclusions can be 
considered valid. The six case studies are descriptive in nature and their purpose is simply to 
serve as examples. No arguments or conclusions are drawn based on the cases.
External validity refers to the generalizability of the results. This study describes the particular 
historical development that has occurred in China and the results are not generalizable to other 
countries. The six case examples can be generalized to some extent, as many companies have 
similar histories and experiences of China. However, they do not represent all wholly owned 
subsidiaries in China.
Reliability of a study means that another investigator using the same data collection procedures 
would be able to get the same results as the original investigator if the study were to be 
repeated. Thus the study is to be independent of the researcher. (Yin 1989) The research 
process (done according to Yin's (1989) and Eisenhardt's (1989) suggestion) has been 
described in chapter 3.5. To improve the reliability several data sources (interviews, annual 
reports, company websites, press releases, newspaper article, earlier case studies and books) 
were used in writing the cases.
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The difficulty in conducting the case studies was to find more than one interviewee per 
company that would have been able to answer the case study questions. However, although the 
cases are based only on one or two interviews per company, they are adequate in giving a 
general view of the most important factors affecting the entry mode decision. All the 
interviewees had a positive attitude towards the research project and were willing to participate 
in it. Most of the interviewees were also quite open in discussing their mistakes and difficulties, 
not only successes.
The case descriptions aim to describe the companies' histories in China and the reasons that 
led them to choose the WFOE mode. The case descriptions do not attempt to evaluate the 
financial success of the subsidiaries or their future prospects, since that could no have been 
done based on the data available to the researcher.
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3 ENTRY MODE CHOICE THEORIES
A company seeking to enter a foreign market must take an important strategic decision on 
which entry mode to use for that market. In addition to the form of investment, ownership 
arrangements are a critical element of the FDI strategy. This includes the choice between a 
wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) and a joint venture (JV). The mode of foreign entry influences 
the extent of control the firm can exercise on its foreign operations (Anderson & Gatignon, 
1986) and its subsequent performance (Hill et al. 1990).
Figure 3-1: Hierarchy of Entry Modes
Choice of Entry Modes
Non-Equity Modes
Export Contractual
-Direct export Agreements
- Indirect export - Licensing
- Others - R&D contracts
- Alliances
- Others
Source: Pan and Tse (2000)
Equity Modes
Equity Joi nt Wholly Owned
Ventures Subsidiaries
- Minority - Greenfield
- 50% share -Acquisition
- Majority - Others
The question of entry mode decision has been studied and discussed widely in the international 
busmess literature. Several conceptual frameworks on international entry mode have been 
introduced and tested, and they provide complementary and overlapping explanations of the 
market entry strategy in foreign markets. These include e g. the following: stages pattern of 
mtemationalization (Luostarinen, 1970 and 1979; Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; 
Johanson and Vahlne 1977), resource based theory (Madhok 1997), transaction cost and 
internalization theory (Williamson 1979, Anderson & Gatignon 1986, Hennart & Eapen 
2001), different kinds of eclectic ffamew'orks (Dunning 1988, Hill et. al 1990 and Kim & 
Hwang 1992) and bargaining power framework (Gomes-Gasseres 1989 and 1990, Ramamurti 
2001). Each of the frameworks has also received criticism and their usefulness to explain the 
entry mode choice has been discussed in the literature (see Anderson 1997). So far the existing 
literature has not reached an agreement on which conceptual framework and constructs should 
be used to explain a firm’s foreign market entry mode (ibid.).
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In this chapter, first the different factors affecting the entry mode choice and the most 
important differences between joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries are presented. 
Then, the different conceptual frameworks for entry mode selection are presented and 
discussed in chapters 3.2 (internationalization approach), 3.3 (transaction cost and 
organizational capability perspectives) and 3.4 (bargaining power framework).
3.1 FACTORS IN THE ENTRY MODE CHOICE
General Factors
A company's choice of its entry mode for a given target country is the result of several often 
conflicting forces. Root (1994, 28) divides these factors into external and internal factors (see 
Figure 2). External factors are market, production and environmental factors in both the target 
and home countries that cannot be affected by management decision. These include e.g. size of 
the target market, competitive structure, marketing infrastructure, production costs, 
government policies and regulations, cultural distance and smallness of the home market. The 
internal factors include product characteristics (e.g. how differentiated and technology­
intensive the products are, need for service and possible need for adaptation) and company's 
resource and commitment factors, i.e. company's resources in management, capital, technology 
and production and marketing skills, and its willingness to commit these resources to foreign 
market development. (Root 1994)
Figure 3-2: Factors in the Entry Mode Decision
Source: Root ( 1994, 29)
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Control versus the Cost of Resource Commitments
Nonnative decision theory suggests that the choice of a foreign market entry mode should be 
based on trade-offs between risks and returns. However, behavioural evidence indicates that a 
firm's choices may also be determined by resource availability and need for control. (Agarwal 
and Ramaswami, 1992)
Foreign entry mode choices are often viewed as trade-offs between control and the cost of 
resource commitments (see Figure 2-3), often under conditions of considerable risk and 
uncertainty (Anderson and Gatignon 1986). Control refers to a firm's need to influence 
systems, methods, and decisions in the foreign market. Control is desirable to improve a firm's 
competitive position and maximize the returns on its assets and skills. Yet control, while 
obviously desirable, carries a high price. To take control, a firm must take responsibility for 
decision-making, which it may be unwilling or unable to carry out in an uncertain foreign 
environment. Furthermore, control requires commitment of resources, which increases 
overhead cost and decreases the firms' flexibility to change its operation mode if needed.
Figure 3-3: Control vs. Risk/Commitment
Wholly
owned
subsidiary
1
Joint
venture
Ô
A
Licensing
Indirect
export
Agent / 
distributor 
export
0 —y Risk/Co mmit ment
Adapted from Root (1994, 39)
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Wholly Owned Subsidiaries as Compared to Joint Ventures
What are the key differences between wholly owned subsidiaries and joint ventures, and what 
kind of effects do they have on the operation of the unit? In this chapter I will briefly describe 
the advantages and disadvantages of the joint venture mode as compared to wholly owned units 
to understand the most important factors involved in the entry mode decisions.
Harrigan (1985, 27-41) divides the different possible motivations for joint venture fonnation 
into three groups: internal uses, competitive uses and strategic uses. By internal uses Harrigan 
means ways of creating internal strengths in the firm. Joint ventures can be used to aggregate 
and share resources, and share costs and risks. Moreover, a joint venture can be way to obtain 
resources that are not for sale (for example technology or distribution networks). Competitive 
uses are ways to strengthen the current strategic position of the company, for example by 
gaining competitive advantages through faster market entry or influencing the industry 
structure evolution in a favourable manner. In Harrigan s studies strategic uses include 
creation and exploitation of synergies, technology transfer and diversification.
Luostarinen and Welch (1990, 159-160) present the following advantages of joint ventures:
1. Saving of capital. The amount of capital needed to operations is reduced by joint ventures 
as investments are shared by the partners.
2. Reduction of risks. Large political or commercial risks may dissuade the firm from acting 
on a solo basis, a joint venture being the only possibility considered seriously: host country 
officials are not as eager to nationalize or to confiscate the firm if it is partly owned by 
locals especially if linked to the government in some form.
3. National Image. Specially in a distant culture partial local ownership may eliminate local 
suspicions, ‘‘open doors” and facilitate in getting government orders, especially in a 
country with strong national feelings and/or long cultural distance from the investor's 
country,
4. Local knowledge and experience. Local participation may improve operations due to better 
knowledge of markets, habits, language, local management style etc. Local partner may 
also provide access to distribution networks and other resources.
As described above, joint ventures provide significant benefits for both partners. But there are 
also significant risks and problems involved. According to Beamish and Reynolds (in Datta, 
1988, 78-90) the failure rate of joint ventures is as high as 45-50%, especially in less
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developed countries such as China. It is often argued that a joint venture is only the second 
best alternative to a wholly owned subsidiary (Root 1994, 172).
JVs often suffer from rigidity in their management. At the starting point some assumptions and 
plans are made but when the environment changes it is difficult for the JV to adapt to these 
changes because of joint control and often differing objectives of the partners. Sovereignty 
conflicts originating from different objectives of the partner, loss of autonomy in strategy 
implementation and loss of control of the strategic resources transferred to the JV may cause 
frustration and affect the performance and management of the venture. These problems may 
also often be due to the partners' inexperience in cooperative operations, which leads to poor 
management of the JV (Harrigan, 1985, 36-40).
Luostarinen and Welch (1990, 160-161) list among others the following disadvantages of joint 
ventures:
1. Different objectives of the partners.
2. Profits may be smaller because part of them are distributed to partners and the 
performance of the venture may be weaker if the partners are not able to cooperate 
properly.
3. Problems in purchasing and personnel policies.
4. Political problems. The local partner's political connections may cause difficulties.
5. Financing problems. The local partner is often not interested in making new investments 
and the partners may not agree on whether profits should be invested or pocketed.
6. Dead-end street problems in decision making where the partners are not able to agree.
3.2 INTERNATIONALIZATION MODEL
The stages model of internationalization has been developed mainly by the Scandinavian 
researchers: Luostarinen (1979), Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1970 and 1975) and 
Johanson and Vahlne (1977 and 1990). The basic thesis of all these studies is that 
internationalization is essentially a path-dependent incremental process where the pattern of 
international involvement of a firm is a function of its past international experience. According 
to the stage theories investors increase their investment commitments to foreign countries 
incrementally, advancing from a) no regular export; b) export via independent representatives
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or agents; c) sales subsidiaries; and d) production plants, as they gain accumulated knowledge 
and experience in the host market.
Although not explicitly stated, the internationalization model of Johanson and Vahlne (1977) 
rests on the resource-based theory (Andersen 1997). A basic assumption in these models is that 
lack of knowledge in an obstacle to the development of international operations that can be 
overcome through experience over time. Thus the existing stock of firm's resources and 
capabilities both direct and limit its strategic evaluation of a particular market entry 
(Johansson and Vahlne 1977, Luostarinen 1979). Luostarinen (1979, 50-63) also underlines 
the influential role of lateral rigidity in the decision process, meaning that the entry mode 
choice is confined by the limited perception of alternatives and selective search.
Luostarinen (1979, 109-112, 182) further elaborates his internationalization model by 
identifying four categories of various types of outward international operations according to 
combination of functional and investment classifications. Direct investment is here separated 
into two categories: namely, into direct investment marketing operations (DIMOs) and direct 
investment production operations (DIPOs). However, the different ownership arrangements 
(wholly owned or joint venture) are not discussed.
Although the stages model of internationalization does not explicitly focus on the choice 
between a joint venture and wholly ow ned mode, its contribution to the framework of this study 
is the understanding that the entry mode choice is a affected by the company's earlier 
international and host country experimental knowledge, and the lateral rigidity in the decision 
process. Further, the logic would imply that less investment demanding joint ventures would be 
selected before direct investment based wholly owned mode.
3.3 TRANSACTION COST AND ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITY 
APPROACHES
3.3.1 Transaction Cost Approach
The transaction cost approach (TCA) has been fairly commonly utilized in the entry mode 
research. The transaction cost approach describes cross-border activities according to the
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economic rationale that firms choose the entry mode, which involves lowest cost (or highest 
risk-adjusted rate of return) associated with the transactions in the entire value chain.
According to the TCA, asset specificity (the degree to which assets are specialized to support 
trade for only a few parties), external and internal uncertainty, and the frequency of 
transactions represent the core dimensions of the transaction (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). 
The composition of these dimensions is decisive for the way cost efficient governance modes 
are assigned to the transaction (Williamson, 1979). The decision maker is assumed to act 
under bounded rationality and sometimes display opportunistic behaviour. The transaction cost 
approach emphasized the importance of firm and industry specific factors but also recognized 
that certain country specific factors influence these costs.
From transaction cost perspective the choice between a JV and a WOS is a trade-off between 
the costs of using market or internal channels for transferring organizational capabilities. As an 
example, a firm could get the needed local expertise either by hiring the services of a local firm 
(e g., to supply market research and represent the foreign firm in negotiations with the local 
government), or by forming a joint venture with a local firm. In the first case it would be 
acquiring an organizational capability' by using the market; in the second it would be using an 
internal channel, because the capabilities would be transferred from a party with an ownership 
share in the venture.
The TCA predicts that a firm with high asset specificity prefer high-control (wholly owned 
subsidiary) modes. The internalization perspective reasons that market mechanisms for the 
transfer of know-how fail when the know-how is of a tacit nature. (Anderson and Gatignon, 
1986)
The external uncertainty is considered as conditions that make optimal contracting unrealistic. 
Thus, when faced with external uncertainty, opportunistic behaviour of partner, and asset 
specificity, firms are better off internalizing the transaction by a subsidiary. (Anderson and 
Gatignon, 1986)
3.3.2 The Role of Locally Held Assets
Recently Heimart and Eapen (2001) pointed out an important shortcoming in the transaction 
cost approach (TCA) based entry mode literature concerning the role of locally held assets in
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the entry mode decision. According to Hennart and Eapen (2001) the entry mode choice has 
been explained only by studying the asset characteristics of the MNE seeking to enter a foreign 
market, while the role of the locally held assets has been ignored.
The "bundling theory" of Hennart and Eapen (2001) commences from the notion that 
production and distribution of a product in a foreign market requires the bundling of a number 
of resources, which in some cases may be separately held. An MNE seeking penetration into a 
foreign market typically holds assets such as product know-how and a strong and popular 
trademark, while parties in the local market possess complementary assets such as knowledge 
of the local markets and access to raw materials and existing distribution networks.
The separately held assets have to be bundled together to enable products' production and sale. 
This can be done through a licensing, a joint venture or a wholly owned subsidiary. The factors 
that determine the bundling mode are (Hennart and Eapen, 2001):
1 ) The relative importance of the locally held complementary assets to the MNE (and vice 
versa)
2) The transaction properties of these assets, i.e. how tradable they are
And consequently, the mode of entry is determined jointly by the TC characteristics of the 
MNE-held and locally held assets that need to bundled together (see Figure 3-4 below), the 
most favourable bundle being the one with the lowest transaction costs.
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Figure 3-4: Bundling Framework
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Thus, considering the wholly owned subsidiary' mode, the bundling theory predicts that a firm 
will prefer a wholly owned mode when the locally owned assets (e.g. local know how, access to 
distribution networks and raw material and production facilities) are available to purchase with 
a low transaction cost (for example, when the firm can easily acquire local knowledge by 
hiring local managers). Or, the firm does not consider the local assets to be important to its 
operations (for example, when the firm decides to run the operations “its own way” regardless 
of the local habits, and it produces only for export, so there is no need for local market 
knowledge).
3.3.3 Dunning’s OLI - Paradigm
Building on the transaction cost view, Dunning’s (1988) OLI-paradigm a.k.a. eclectic 
framework integrates several strands of international business theories on cross-border 
business activities. While transaction cost approach mostly concentrates on firm and industry 
specific factors Dunning’s eclectic framework clearly emphasizes also the value of country- 
specific factors.
Dumiing (1988) suggests that the following factors will influence a firm's choice of entry' 
mode:
1) Ownership advantages refer to a company’s possession of superior assets and skills with 
respect to other firms, especially those of the host country. To compete with host country firms
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in their own markets, firms must possess superior assets and skills that can earn economic 
rents that are high enough to counter the higher cost of serving these markets. The ownership 
advantages include for example company size, multinational experience and company's ability 
to develop differentiated products. According to Pan (1996, 3) in general, a firm will prefer to 
adopt a wholly owned operation or acquire a majority ownership in an overseas JV in order to 
protect and fully exploit its ownership advantages.
3) Locational advantages reflect how attractive the specific country is. These locational 
advantages include e.g. country risks, market potential, location familiarity and host country 
government's incentives or restrictions.
2) Internalization advantages are concerned with the costs of choosing a hierarchical mode of 
operation over external mode. This is uniform with the discussion in the transaction cost 
approach on using market or internal channels for transferring organizational capabilities. Joint 
ventures and wholly owned operations differ m the concept of internalization in a sense that in 
a joint venture a firm does not fully internalize the production overseas. Instead, the firm 
shares the ownership and the control of the venture with a local partner.
3.3.4 Entry Mode Choice as a Part of MNC’s Global Strategy
Dunning's eclectic framework has been further developed by Hill et al. (1990) and Kim and 
Hwang (1992). They emphasize the importance of global strategic considerations in choosing 
multinationals’ entry mode. While the existing studies until then had already identified 
numerous variables that influence the entry mode decision, according to Kim and Hwang those 
variables could be collapsed into one of two categories: environmental or transaction-specific 
factors. Furthermore, common to these studies was an underlying assumption that each entry 
decision is made in isolation and is driven essentially by efficiency considerations at the level 
of the individual entrant or subsidiary. Kim and Hwang (1992) introduce a third group of 
factors - global strategic considerations (global concentration, global strategic motivations 
and global synergies).
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Figure 3-5: Kim & Hwang’s Eclectic Framework
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The theoretical background to this can be traced back to the work of Perlmutter (1969) that 
acknowledged the increasing existence of geometric approaches to multinational management, 
where the subsidian- units are not seen as portfolio of independent units but as an 
interdependent network. Thus, according to Kim and Hwang (1992) multinationals do/should 
not make their entry mode decisions in isolation, but to consider the interdependencies across 
the company units and countries, and the global strategy.
Gomes-Casseres (1989) found that firms with more localized strategies had a preference for 
joint ventures while firms pursuing a global strategy (measured by the percentage of intra­
system sales to total sales) had a preference for subsidiaries over joint ventures. Kim and 
Hwang's (1992) study showed similar tendencies.
3.3.5 Organizational Capability Perspective
While the transaction cost/intemalization perspective analyses entry mode choice on the basis 
of transaction costs minimization, the organizational capability (OC) perspective concentrates 
on the value of firm's capabilities. The OC perspective is based on the resource-based theory 
(Penrose, 1959) and shares the emphasis on the experimental knowledge as noted by 
Luostarinen (1979) and Johansson and Vahlne (1977). The organizational capability (OC) 
perspective perceives the firm as a bundle of relatively static and transferable resources, which 
are then transformed into capabilities through dynamic and interactive firm-specific processes 
where individual skills, organization and technology are inextricably woven together (Madhok, 
1997).
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Intangible resources such as skills and competencies (i.e. know how) can be viewed as 
composed of an embedded and a generic (non-embedded) component. Madhok (1997) proposes 
that firms with a high embedded-to-generic know how ration tend to have greater preference 
for internalization, i.e. prefer wholly owned subsidiaries to joint operations. This idea is in 
accordance with the ownership advantage effect presented earlier in Dunning's eclectic 
framework.
Also market knowledge has both general (generic) and specific (embedded) components 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). Here the OC perspective differs from the eclectic framew'ork. 
Whereas in Dunning's (1988) eclectic framework the location was treated as a source of 
locational advantages, Madhok (1997) sees the locational effects as difficulties in exploiting 
the firm's existing know how due to the differences in home and host country environments. 
Thus, according to Madhok (1997) when the embedded-to-generic ration of market knowledge 
is high, firms will have greater preference for collaboration (i.e. joint operations).
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Organizational Capabilities and Cultural Distance
How does national culture affect company’s international entry mode selection? Does greater 
the socio-cultural distance between the home and host countries the lower the degree of control 
a firm should demand, or vice versa?
Empirical studies linking national cultural distance and entry mode selection have produced 
contradictory results. For instance, Shane (1994) and Anand and Delios (1997) found that 
large cultural distance was associated with high control (wholly owned) entry modes. In 
contrast, Kogut and Sign (1988), and Erramilli and Rao (1993) found cultural distance to be 
related to the use of shared-control (joint venture) modes of entry. And lastly, Erramilli (1996) 
and Gatignon and Anderson (1988) found no relationship between cultural distance and entry 
mode choice.
The view that firms prefer joint venture modes in culturally distant countries can be explained 
by investing firm's desire to speed the organizational learning process, increase local 
knowledge, and reduce uncertainty. Not knowing, being comfortable with or even agreeing 
with the values and operating methods of the host country, firms may shy away from high 
commitment and control. Here a joint venture serves the purpose of assigning management 
tasks to local partners who are better able to manage the local labour force and relationships 
with suppliers, buyers, and governments. Gatignon and Anderson (1988) state that "joint 
ventures w ith local investors may be seen as a way of bridging cultural gaps".
What would then explain that in some studies firms have been found to prefer own subsidiaries 
in environments that are culturally very different? According to Madhok ( 1997) in a situation 
of high socio-cultural distance, a partner's capabilities might be limited or routines 
substantially different due to the different work context, which would result in an inability to 
absorb and exploit the know-how efficiently. In other words, in a culturally distant 
environment a firm might see a substantial advantage in doing business its "own way", using 
its own operation procedures and methods regardless of those of the host country, and 
therefore prefer a wholly owned mode.
Furthermore, trying to explain the contradictory results of empirical studies Brouthers and 
Brouthers (2001) argued that firms prefer wholly owned mode in culturally distant countries if 
the country risk is high. They suggests that in culturally distant and high investment risk
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countries firms react to uncertainty by exerting control to better manage their volatile affairs 
and resolve disputes, and therefore prefer high control modes.
3.4 BARGAINING POWER FRAMEWORK
The bargaining power framework for entry mode choice recognizes the importance of host 
government restrictions that limit equity held by a foreign firm, and suggests that a firm's 
options will be dependent on its negotiations with the host country government. Higher level of 
ownership is possible if the firm has superior bargaining power to the host government. On the 
other hand, a firm may be restricted to share ownership if the host government has better 
bargaining strength (Larimo, 1992, 2). According to Gomes-Casseres (1989, 2) the process by 
which an MNE chooses the ownership structure of a subsidiary can be divided into two stages: 
(1) determination of the firm's preference i.e. what ownership structure does the firm want; 
and (2) entry negotiations with host governments i.e. what ownership structure can the firm 
get.
According to Gomes-Casseres (1990, 4) it is important to recognize that ownership structure is 
not an all-important issue to firms, or to governments for that matter. Both parties might be 
willing to accept something less than their top ownership preference in return for gains on other 
issues. This brings us to the question of bargaining power between the parties. As an example, 
in a developing country where governments often prefer JVs to WOSs, the government might 
drop its insistence on a JV if the firm can contribute something significant (e.g. latest 
technology) to the development of the economy. Or the firm might settle for less than full 
ownership to gam access to a lucrative market.
According to Gomes-Casseres (1990, 4), as a result of the bargaining process, the ownership 
structure that the MNE actually ends up with is a function of: (1) the intensity to which it 
wants a certain ownership structure; and (2) its bargaining power relative to the government's. 
And as an end result, host government ownership restrictions and incentives can have two 
kinds of effects: (1) they may lead to the firm compromising for something else than its top 
ownership preference; or (2) they can deter the firm from investing at all.
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Figure 3-6: Bargaining Power Framework of Entry Mode Choice
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Recently Ramamurti (2001) argued for the obsolescence of the old bargaining power 
framework and presented a new ‘two-tier bargaining power model'. According to him MNC- 
host country relations can no longer be viewed as a static, two-party negotiation, but rather 
must be viewed as a dynamic, two tier multi-party bargaining process. Tier-1 bargaining 
occurs between host developing countries and home (industrialized) countries, and takes place 
bilaterally or through multilateral institutions like the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO. 
These negotiations produce macro rules or principles governing FDI, anchored in bilateral or 
multilateral agreements, which then constrain micro negotiations in tier-2 between individual 
MNCs and host governments.
Bargaining Power Framework and LDCs
According to Larimo (1992, 2) the bargaining power approach applies well to FDIs made in 
less developed countries (LDCs), because the role of government concerning FDI is usually 
much greater in these countries. Empirical studies, focusing on the ownership arrangements of 
FDIs undertaken in developed countries, indicate that investors have preferred wholly owned 
subsidiaries to joint ventures (Larimo and Mäkelä 1995). The findings of these studies contrast 
sharply with those concerning the behaviour of investors in developing countries. In most of 
the studies focusing on LDC investments, joint venture has been identified as the predominant 
ownership arrangement. (Larimo and Mäkelä 1995)
In developing countries like China the host country government plays an important role in 
regulating foreign investments and have their own motivations and objectives. These can be for 
example increased local employment, import substitution, saving of foreign exchange, 
technology transfer, minimization of foreign control in the local economy and protection of
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domestic industries. And therefore governments often try to affect FDI through restrictions and 
incentives.
According to Larimo and Mäkelä (1995, 27) in developing countries JV ownership 
arrangements are mainly triggered by host government policies, though recently, as FDI 
restrictions have been liberalized in many developing countries, partner's knowledge of the 
local market, investment climate, business culture etc., has come to play a more central motive 
behind JVs in these countries. The change in governments' attitudes towards foreign 
investment is largely attributable to the growing recognition of the role of FDI in generating 
economic growth in developing countries. Thus, at least in some LDCs, the bargaining power 
approach has been losing its significance in explaining the determinants of the size of foreign 
ownership.
3.5 SUMMARY
The choice between different entry modes can be characterized as choosing between different 
levels of costs, resource commitments, control and risk. These are affected by both firm 
internal (e.g. resources and motives) and external (production and environmental factors) 
factors.
The internationalization model sees the entry mode choice as path-dependent - investors 
increase their investment commitments to foreign countries incrementally as they gain 
accumulated knowledge and experience in the host markets.
The transaction cost approach takes an economistic view to the entry mode choice, a rationale 
that firms choose the entry mode, which involves lowest cost associated with the transactions 
in the entire value chain. The research done based on the transaction cost theory suggests that a 
firm will choose a wholly owned subsidiary when the firm is large, when its assets are highly 
specific, when its know how is of tacit nature and when there is high external uncertainty. The 
organizational capability perspective emphasized the importance of company resources and 
know how as the decisive factors.
The key difference between internationalization model and transaction cost approach is howr 
they stance toward uncertainty. According to internationalization model companies react to the
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uncertainty of an unknown market by proceeding incrementally. Then again according to the 
transaction cost view companies react to uncertainty by seeking better control of the 
operations.
The bargaining power approach to entry mode choice emphasized the role that governments 
play in foreign investment decisions. The bargaining power view is useful especially in 
understanding the entry mode choices in developing countries.
Joint Venture or Wholly Owned Subsidiary?
What are then the critical factors when considering an entry mode choice between a wholly 
owned subsidiary and a joint venture? According to the literature reviewed, the advantages of 
joint ventures are mainly based on the opportunity to combine the material and human 
resources of the partners, in order to produce complementarity and, at best, also synergy. 
(Larimo and Mäkelä, 1995) “Among the most commonly cited reasons for taking a local 
partner are to obtain capital and vital raw materials, to spread the risks, to increase economies 
of scale, to gain a more rapid markets entry and a local image, as well as to acquire knowledge 
of the local economy, politics, customs, legislation etc. (Larimo and Mäkelä, 1995)'’ Also, host 
country specific know how is of special significance in LDCs, where the operating environment 
differs considerably from that of developed countries. The need for local know how is further 
accentuated if the foreign firm has no prior experience in operating in the country, (ibid.)
Compared to joint venture mode the most important advantages of wholly owned subsidiaries 
relate to full control of the operations. The company can operate its business independently and 
can implement whatever management system, and therefore enjoys higher flexibility and 
control. Further, the investing firm does not have to share secret technological or competitive 
information to a partner. The entry mode choice is also affected by the firm's global strategy. 
Often finns prefer wholly owned subsidiaries because they want to create a close global 
network of interdependent units. The important disadvantages of not having a local partner 
relate to local knowledge, connections to local business entities and authorities and national 
image that a local partner can provide. Furthermore, wholly owned subsidiaries require higher 
investments and are thus considered to have higher risk.
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Theoretical Framework for the Study
The following theoretical framework is a collection of key factors affecting the decision 
between a JV and a wholly owned subsidiary mode. The framework combines ideas from the 
different theories discussed in this chapter. It emphasizes the investor’s earlier experience and 
resources, but takes also into account their limitations. In addition, motivations and strategies 
play an important role. The prospective partner box asks the critical questions concerning the 
feasibility of the joint venture option.
There is a great number of host country environmental factors that influence the entry mode 
decisions of firms (see e.g. Root 1994). However, many of them, such as labour cost, are 
relevant only when choosing whether to invest in a certain country or not, but are not relevant 
when choosing between wholly owned and joint venture mode. In the framework below, only 
the factors that are most likely to have a significant effect on the “joint venture or wholly 
owned" -question have been listed. These are: 1) Socio-cultural factors; Especially, how 
familiar the company is with the host country? And whether the company reacts to cultural 
distance by finding a partner to provide local knowledge, or whether it seeks full control to 
avoid cross-cultural management problems. 2) Political and legal factors; i.e. what kind of 
laws, restrictions and incentives concern joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries. And 3) 
Market/Competitive factors. This last category covers a wide range of factors such as, who are 
the competitors and customers and what is the competitive structure.
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Figure 3-7: Theoretical Framework - "Joint venture or wholly owned subsidiary?"
Entering Firm
- Does the company have earlier 
operations or knowledge of doing 
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- Does the company have needed 
resources (human, financial etc.)?
- Is the companywilling to commit 
resources and to take control?
- Does it need connections or 
resources that a partner could 
provide?
- What are the strategic motivations/ 
objectives in the host country?
- What is the company’s global 
strategy?
Prospective Partner
Competencies Fit 
Do the prospective partners have 
the critical resources needed for 
competitive advantage and can they 
contribute it?
Strategic Fit
Are the objectives compatible?
For how long?
Culturé Fit
Can they understand each other? 
Can theyfunction together? 
Organizational Fit
Are the decision making and control 
mechanisms conducive to good joint 
management of the Jointventure?
(Lasserre and Schütte 2000)
Joint venture or wholly onwed subsidiary?
Host Country Environment
Socio-Cultural Factors
- How familiar is the location?
- What is the cultural distance?
Political and Legal Factors
-What are the government policies toward foreign investment?
-What restrictions/incentives there are concerning JVs and wholly owned 
subsidiaries?
- How well developed is the legal system?
Market/Comoetitive Factors
-Who are the competitors and what is their position and strategies?
- Who are the customers and how can they be reached?
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4 FOREIGN COMPANIES IN CHINA
This chapter attempts to answer the question of why the structure of FDI in China has changed 
dramatically over the past two decades. First, the role of Chinese government and its foreign 
investment policy is discussed in chapter 4.1. Then, chapter 4.2 continues by analyzing the 
challenges of the business environment in China, and its effects on the entry mode decisions of 
foreign companies.
4.1 THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
4.1.1 Development of FDI in China
In the turn of the 1980's Peoples Republic of China chose open door policy to develop its 
economy and industries by permitting foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country. The 
open door policy was adopted because the Chinese government believed it could acquire four 
items that the country desperately needed: capital, high technology, advanced management 
know-how and access to international markets.
The first step of the open door policy was the promulgation of the '"Law on Joint Ventures 
Using Chinese and Foreign Investment7’ in 1979 that gave foreign companies a possibility to 
invest in China through Sino-foreign joint ventures. In addition, in 1979 China established four 
Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the southern coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, 
giving them autonomous power and privileges to attract foreign direct investment. In theory 
establishing wholly foreign owned enterprises became possible only in 1986 with the 
promulgation of “Law on Enterprises Operated Exclusively with Foreign Capital”. However, 
in practice the Chinese official started to actively apply this law only in the early 1990s, and 
the rush of wholly owned subsidiaries started around 1993. (See Table 1-2 on page 9)
Since the opening, FDI into China has grown drastically (see Table 1-1 on page 5). The 
growth of FDI has been especially fast after 1991. By 1995 the inflow of FDI into China 
already ranked the second highest in the world, only behind the USA. In 1997 the inflow of 
FDI into China accounted $45 billion, over half of the flows into Asia and 11 percent of the 
world total (Luo, 2001). In 2001,
During the past two decades the structure and modes of FDI into China have changed 
considerably. Firstly, several new investment vehicles such as umbrella companies,
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acquisitions of Chinese enterprises, and build-operate-transfers have been created. Secondly, 
the use of the already existent entry modes is undergoing structural changes. Until quite 
recently the equity joint venture was the most common investment vehicle used by foreign 
investors. Between 1979 and June 2000, foreign companies entered into 201,848 EJV 
contracts. However, in the 1990"s the share of WFOEs has been increasing considerably. 
While in 1990 only 12% of all foreign-funded enterprises approved up to then were WFOEs, in 
1997, WFOEs surpassed equity joint ventures as the most popular foreign investment vehicle 
(see Table 1-2 on page 9). (Sutter, 2000) In 2001 around 60% of all new foreign invested 
enterprises where WFOEs (China Statistical Abstract 2001).
4.1.2 The Chinese Government Policy on FDI
The FDI policy of the Chinese government has been one of the most important reasons why the 
JV long dominated foreign direct investment. Although it has from a legal perspective been 
possible to establish WFOEs already from 1986, for a long time the Chinese government very 
strongly favoured JVs. Especially in the beginning WFOEs were not given a high priority in 
China, which has sought to limit the invasion of foreigners in terms of control. According to 
Behrman (et al. 1991, 52-53) the tendency to limit WFOEs was motivated by China's desire to 
understand their benefits and disadvantages before a significant number of WFOEs were 
established. JVs were seen as more favourable because the Chinese officials believed that joint 
ventures offered a better structure to transfer technology and management know-how to China. 
Thus, the use of WFOEs used to be limited more or less to situations in which the technology 
desired was significant or a large part of the output of the company was to be exported. Still in 
the late 90s the regulations required that 50% of WFOEs production had to be exported and 
that the WFOEs had to be “high-technology” companies, a status that was granted by special 
scientific review boards.
The Chinese government did not earlier only restrict the use of WFOEs but also gave 
preferential treatment for JVs. Until July 1991, equity joint ventures received a favourable tax 
treatment as compared to WFOEs. The taxation of the different forms of enterprises was so 
different, that for tax reasons alone, equity joint ventures became the favoured vehicle for 
investment. Since 1994 the tax treatment of these forms of investment has been virtually equal. 
(Zee and Ho, 1994) Earlier WFOEs also faced more stringent foreign exchange rules, but 
nowadays WFOEs and JVs operate under similar foreign-exchange rules and comparable 
import and export regulations for licensing, quotas and duties (Vanhonacker, 1997, 130). Also,
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the legislation governing joint ventures in China was for a long time much more comprehensive 
and official interpretations were more predictable than is in the case of WFOEs.
As China's experience with foreign investment increased, the Chinese learned that JVs restrict 
investment by some companies because of corporate policy; they learned also that WFOEs 
employ Chinese, who will become technically trained and experienced in management know­
how. Consequently, Chinese government and authorities became more open to WFOEs. 
Furthermore, the WFOE has also proven to be an ideal structure in the tight credit market of 
recent years, in which Chinese partners have been unable to contribute the necessary start up 
or expansion capital (Sutter, 2000).
Restrictions Still Occur
However, foreign investment is still very much regulated in China. Investment is still officially 
directed by the Catalogue Guiding Foreign Investment in Industry (see Appendix 3), which 
designates investment in particular sectors as "encouraged," "permitted," "discouraged," or 
"prohibited.” Restrictions exist often because of national security reasons or need to protect the 
domestic industry'. (Sutter, 2000). Equity and geographic restrictions still exist in many 
sectors, particularly in services, in so-called "pillar industries" of Chinese economic 
development, like aviation, autos, and chemicals, and in sensitive areas like publishing and 
broadcasting. In these industries foreign investment is usually allowed only through JVs.
Then again, the regulatory environment in China is still evolving with more sectors opening up 
for foreign investment. In addition to opening new industries to foreign investment the PRC 
government has also offered more investment options in recent years, and have become more 
willing to approve vehicles that foreign investors prefer, especially the wholly foreign-owned 
enterprise.
Also, according to Vanhonacker (1997) Chinese officials are nowadays far more concerned 
about what outsider investors bring to the country in terms of jobs, technology and foreign 
exchange, than how their deals are structured. Vanhonacker argues that more important than 
the regulations themselves are the principles that underlie them. China wants and needs foreign 
investors, and if they can offer something of value to China all regulations and form of the 
investment are largely negotiable. This suggests that one important factor when choosing an 
operation mode in China is the bargaining power that the foreign investor has; e.g. advanced
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technology. When negotiating with the local authorities e g. large high technology companies 
can perhaps to a large degree dictate the terms of the investment.
In short, although it has from a legal perspective been possible to establish WFOEs already 
from 1986, the Chinese government has vety strongly favoured JVs. Also, earlier foreign 
investors have perhaps opted for JVs because; in general there were little experience on how 
WFOEs would function in practice and how they would be treated by the local authorities.
4.1.3 The WTO
In the late 2001 after 15 years of negotiations China was accepted as a member of the Word 
Trade Organization (WTO). While China’s WTO membership will have the strongest effect on 
agriculture and automobile industry, it will touch all business in China, at least indirectly. 
Most foreign companies expect competition in the Chinese market to increase, and hope that 
China manages to bring its investment and business laws in line with international practices. 
This would decrease the risk of doing business in China and make the administrative matters 
easier. (Kaislaniemi 2002)
China' s WTO accession will affect wholly foreign owned companies mainly in two ways. 
Firstly, China's accession to the WTO will decrease customs duties immediately. The duties on 
the 150 most important EU products will decrease from 18,9 % to 10,8 %. These will be 
implemented product category by product category by year 2006. For example, considering the 
important Finnish industries, the duties on paper, cardboard and wood product will decrease 
form 12-25% to 5-7,5%. The duties on telecommunication products will decrease to zero. 
(Talouselämä 9.3.2001) This will decrease the cost of importing, and naturally also increase 
competition in the Chinese market.
Secondly, the anticipated new legislation should benefit wholly foreign owned enterprises 
significantly. For example, within three years of accession, WFOEs should gain distribution 
rights, including the ability to provide after-sales service, warehousing, transportation, and 
logistics services. (Sutter, 2000) (see also Zeng 2002) The anticipated trading right law will 
allow foreign companies to engage in importing activities. So far WFOEs have been allowed to 
sell only products produced in China and to import only components for their own production. 
For import of other products companies have been forced to use the services of licensed state- 
owned export-import companies. However, exactly how and when these WTO commitments
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are incorporated into Chinese legislation and how they will be implemented by officials is not 
sure.
According to Sutter (2000) China's entry into the WTO will bring important new opportunities 
to foreign firms in the PRC, but will not bring great changes for investment structure options 
in China.
"China's need to bring its investment and business laws in line with international 
practices, and satisfy investors' growing demands, will push PRC officials to 
continue tinkering with existing vehicles and introduce new structures. It is unlikely, 
however, that the changes will be rapid or deep enough to meet these demands 
completely. In the meantime, foreign investors will continue to push against the 
ceilings of the old JV and WFOE frameworks, and experiment with the newer, less 
clearly defined options”. (Sutter, 2000)
4.2 THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT IN CHINA
To describe China as a business environment Björkman (2002) gives a list of paradoxes: China 
is poor, but home to some of the world's largest markets, it is backward, but technologically 
quite advanced and some surprisingly strong local companies are emerging, and it is 
communist, but has also extremely competitive markets. According to Björkman (2002) 
foreign companies are interested in China because (1) although poor, it is potentially huge local 
market, (2) China is an important sourcing platform with "relatively inexpensive, huge pool of 
smart, ambitious people many of which have an acceptable secondary and technical education, 
and acceptable perceived political stability” (ibid ), and (3) because of China's future regional 
and global role.
'All you hear about China may be true but none of it is reliable '
(John Frankenstein - China Business Review)
Björkman (2002) also points out that while still ten twenty years ago foreign companies 
entering China could find an untouched market and benefit from the first-mover advantage, 
nowadays "everybody is already there”. In addition to increasing numbers of foreign 
companies nowadays there are also surprisingly strong local players, especially when
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technology is relatively mature, stable and widely available. Many industries are plagued by 
over-capacity, price war, and low efficiency. Currently the local firms in China are still 
concentrating on volume but are moving towards higher quality and value products. The 
foreign firms focus on premium segments, (ibid.)
Although the government still interferes and regulates business in many ways, China is 
nowadays extremely competitive and tough market. Foreign direct investors’ also have to get 
used to the fact that imitation of products is the rule and IPR-problems are common. High 
employee turnover is also a problems in many companies: qualified managerial staff is 
expensive, hard to find and hard to keep. In addition, the significant tax holidays and other 
incentives that investors got still in the investment boom years of the mid-1990s foreign are 
now expiring (Sutter 2000).
The huge size of the country raise a question whether China should be viewed as a single 
market. There are huge economic and cultural differences between provinces, and for many 
products the market is regionally very fragmented. The break-down of the old systems of state- 
owned companies and planned economy has left the distribution very fragmented and 
unprofessional. (Lasserre and Schütte 2000)
Considering the semi-closed and semi-planned economy of China, various regulations, local 
market protectionism, and business network are daunting barriers to foreign MNCs. "In 
addition, unique local cultural and consumption behaviours are new challenges to get to local 
customers. All this points to the need of partnership from appropriate local businesses.” (Pan 
and Chi, 1997) Why are foreign companies then shying away from joint ventures in China?
4.2.1 The Problems with Joint Ventures in China
As described in chapter 2, the joint venture mode provides significant benefits for both 
partners, but also significant risks and problems emerge. The problems of Sino-foreign joint 
ventures are well known and have been studied widely (see e.g. Hamill & Pamblos 1996, 
Wong et al. 1999, Beamish 1993, Shenkar 1990). Wong et al. (1999) list the most common 
problems with JVs in China as following: Human resource problems such as nepotism, 
overstaffing, employees' loyalty to Chinese partner; operational problems such as quality 
control, different management approaches and working methods; and partner related problems 
such as Chinese partners' reluctance to change, political agenda and slowness of decision
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making. In addition to different objectives, numerous cultural differences and different 
approaches to business, even simple issues like lack of basic language skills often make 
cooperation between the Chinese and western companies difficult.
Björkman (2002) lists the following common disappointment with Chinese joint venture 
partners:
Limited guanxi (connections) outside local base, primarily used for own interests
Distribution based on old system, weak outside own base
Very tight financial situation
Short-term orientation
IPR-problems
Difficult to take over existing operation: technology, corporate culture 
Sometimes bad reputation
Lack of fit in tenus of competencies, strategy, culture & organization
According to Pan et al. (1995, 126) foreign managers are generally dissatisfied with the 
performance of their joint ventures in China. Many joint ventures in China were maybe also 
doomed to failure from the beginning. According to Hanes (1998) as western investors rushed 
into the Chinese market in the 80s and early 90s many joint ventures were formed through 
“shotgun weddings”, with unknown partners, sometimes with natural competitors, and without 
clear plans of how the venture would operate.
Different Objectives
Problems arising from the different objectives of the partners are common in JVs. According to 
Datta (1988, 78-90) in JVs the objectives and motives of the local partner often differ 
significantly from the ones of the foreign partner. Local partners, especially in developing 
countries, usually aim at obtaining modem western technology, management know-how, brand 
names and trademarks. These features then facilitate corporate modernization, growth, 
domestic sales and exports. The foreign partner on the other hand, often sees joint venture as a 
vehicle for entering a new market where other operation modes may be less favourable due to 
local legislation or significant political or economic risks.
In sino-foreign JVs the Chinese partner's aim is often to obtain advanced technology and to 
promote exports, while the foreign partner may wish to achieve lower production costs or to
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enter China's domestic market (Martinson and Tseng 1995, Hamill and Pamblos 1996). 
According to Vanhonacker (1997, 135) it is also now widely acknowledged that most Chinese 
companies seek profits on a much shorter time horizon than foreign investors. According to 
Hanes (1998) Chinese partners are accused of looking for immediate profits, then pocketing 
the returns. Foreign partners are said to be obsessed with market share, insisting on reinvesting 
profits to boost size.
To better control the operations of their JVs and decrease the problems deriving from shared 
management foreign investors in China often prefer to hold majority share in joint ventures. 
However, contrary to popular belief, equity stake does not necessarily equal managerial 
control. According to Article 26 of the joint venture law, JVs must obtain the unanimous 
consent of the board of directors on most major investment decisions (Sutter 2000). Thus, little 
can be accomplished without the support of the joint venture partner.
Protecting Technology and Know How
Another issue that strongly supports choosing WFOE instead of JV is the possibility of 
technology leakage. This is perhaps the grayest of the gray areas of doing business in China. 
One of the reasons why China opened its borders for foreign investors was to acquire 
knowledge in latest technologies. In most of the Sino-foreign JVs the foreign partner provides 
the technology for the venture. Chinese companies, naturally, want as much information as 
possible. Foreign investors, however, are reluctant to give away advanced, proprietary 
technology for fear that it will be copied - especially in the light of China’s spotty enforcement 
of intellectual propert}7 rights. There are several examples of joint venture partners starting to 
use the acquired technology for their own purposes and competing with the joint venture. 
Moreover, if the joint venture is dissolved, preventing the Chinese partner from continuing to 
use foreign know-how against the will of the foreign investor can be difficult under current 
conditions (Tao, 1998). Therefore it is not surprising that most investments that involve secret 
formulas and processes take the form of WFOEs (Sutter, 2000).
Although the problems of Sino-foreign joint ventures are well known and real, a JV offers 
several potential benefits that should not be forgotten, the most important being the use of the 
local partner's marketing and distribution networks. A JV can also benefit from any 
government connections the local partner may have. For capital-intensive projects, a JV is 
often a lower-cost alternative to a WFOE greenfield project, because the Chinese partner's
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capital contribution often takes the form of land and existing facilities. In addition, because the 
Chinese government still to some extent favours JVs, a foreign partner can often negotiate 
preferential terms in return for transfer of technology and expertise. These terms may include 
special access to, and rates for, utilities and inputs. (Sutter, 2000)
4.2.2 Guanxi
"It is a fool who does not hire a guide when entering a foreign land ”
Chinese proverb
The Chinese word 'guanxi' means 'relations’, or 'networks’ in business world. These informal 
social networks are developed through natural relationships such as family, marriage, 
schooling and work. The significance of personal relationships is emphasized in Chinese 
society and is traditionally extremely important in all aspects of life from family relations to 
business and politics. Doing business in China one soon learns that doing business without 
guanxi is extremely difficult, and that restrictions are usually not absolute as the Chinese are 
accustomed to solving the most impossible problems by drawing on their connections. 
Businesses with connections, especially at various levels of government, have good access to 
people and resources that can enhance their ability to get things done. But for foreign firms 
new to China, this can be a challenge.
Acquiring the needed guanxi and knowledge of the local markets has been stated as one of the 
most important reasons for foreign companies entering China through JVs instead of WFOEs. 
According to Neubel (1994) WFOEs seem to be voluntarily avoided by foreign investors since 
they suffer from the drawback of lacking the direct linkages to the domestic economic system 
provided by the Chinese partners in joint ventures. WFOEs are therefore perhaps the most 
suitable for those companies with readily formed contacts and long experience of China's 
vastly different culture, language, business climate, and political environment.
It is clear that relations are of utmost importance in China, but how useful are JVs partner in 
providing the necessary connections? It is generally agreed that a good joint venture partner is 
extremely valuable, but on the other hand, for example Vanhonacker (1997, 135) argues that 
more and more foreign companies are finding that the scope of their Chinese partners guanxi is 
limited, may take them in directions that are difficult to control or may not be strategically
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useful. In addition, some companies are finding guanxi may not be cost effective, i.e. a 
company may achieve its goals cheaper through official bureaucracy than through relations.
Considering the WFOE as an operation mode raises the issue of guanxi. Can foreign investors 
successfully make the necessary political, business and social connections themselves? 
According to Vanhonacker (1997, 136) the answer is no. However, he says that some foreign 
investors are relying more and more on agreements with Chinese agents to make liaisons on 
their behalf and to help procure land, materials and services for them. These companies 
identify exactly which connections will help and who has them, and then engage the Chinese 
individuals, companies, or organizations with access to the decision-making authorities as 
“advisers” on short-term contracts.
Foreign firms can also tty to acquire the needed guanxi by hiring managers that already have 
connections with important local officials. For example, according to Bruton et al. (2000) in 
some cities in coastal Chma advertisements for new employees openly state that preferred 
candidates should have good relationships with certain government departments and officials, 
hi tliis way, over time foreign companies will gradually build their own network of 
connections.
4.2.3 Strategic Considerations
Joint ventures as an investment form also pose serious difficulties for the future expansion of 
the company inside China. According to Vanhonacker (1997, 132) the problem is that China's 
planned economic system, which was in operation until 1979, created an enormously 
fragmented industrial environment. Companies were required to make a narrow line of 
products or to operate in a geographically restricted market. Still today, very few Chinese 
companies have a national presence, and those that do, have already been cherry-picked by 
early foreign entrants looking for a JV partner. In other w'ords, the prospects of finding a 
Chinese JV partner that can bring national scope to business are poor. Moreover, according to 
Vanhonacker (1997, 132) every Chinese company belongs to and operates under some 
combination of local, provincial and central government authority, each with its own agenda. 
Borders between the authorities are sharply drawn, and many of them compete with one 
another for resources and regulatory protection. Thus, if a Chinese company tries to do 
business outside its authorized territory it is apt to run into trouble.
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Many multinationals have therefore entered China by establishing several JVs in the major 
regions of the country. However, many of the companies are now struggling with the problem 
of how to integrate their operations in China; for example, how to combine the support 
functions, such as sales force, human resources department and finance operations of their 
separate JVs to reduce duplicate staff. Recently it has become possible to establish a holding 
company in China to group several operations under one roof. But folding several joint 
ventures into a holding company is not easy, since unanimous consent of each joint venture's 
board is required. It is much easier to set up a holding company if all the operating companies 
are wholly owned. (Business China, 1998, 1) Therefore, a MNE aiming for national presence 
in China should carefully consider what kind of market access and expansion potential its 
partner candidates have and whether entering China with a WFOE gives the company better 
expansion possibilities and more freedom in developing its operations.
Combining the JV and WFOE Modes
The answer to the question, JV or WFOE, does not necessary have to be an either-or decision. 
In addition to choosing between JV and WFOE, companies could also consider creative ways 
of combining the two operation modes. These can be refereed to as hybrid company forms.
In his article Vanhonacker (1997, 140) gives three such examples. One option is to have a 
silent JV partner with minority stake in the company. In other words the company would be a 
JV on paper and it could enjoy the benefits that are given to JVs, but still in practice it could be 
operated like a WFOE. With minimum involved of the Chinese partner in the everyday 
management, many of the typical JV managerial problems can be avoided. According to 
Vanhonacker (1997, 140) many Sino-foreign JVs are moving into that direction when the 
foreign partners are increasing their share of ownership in the JVs.
Another way is to establish a WFOE for production purposes and a marketing JV to get access 
to local distribution networks and benefit from the partners knowledge in local markets. A third 
alternative is to establish a JV that after a fixed period of time can be turned in to a WFOE. 
When negotiating the JV contract the option for the foreign partner to buy the Chinese partner 
out after a certain period of time is included in the termination clause. This is a good 
alternative if the value added of the Chinese partner is significant in the early stages of the 
venture. (Vanhonacker 1997, 140)
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4.3 DISCUSSION
The Era of Joint Ventures
The most important reason for the popularity of JV as an investment mode before the mid 
1990's was the restrictions and incentives of the Chinese government. When China in the early 
1980s opened to foreign investment western businesses became dazzled by the size of the 
Chinese markets. Especially in the beginning of the 1990's there was a rush of foreign 
companies to China as everyone wanted their share of this lucrative market. However, the 
Chinese government allowed foreign investment only through JVs. It seems that for many 
companies joint venture as an operation mode was not their own preference but rather a price 
for being able to do business in China.
The possibility to establish WFOEs became possible much later (legally in 1986, in practice in 
early 1990"s). and even after that the WFOE option was highly restricted for a long time. In 
the beginning foreign investors also often opted for the JV mode because there was no 
experience of how WFOEs would function in practice and how they would be treated by the 
local authorities. Also, the need for local expertise and relations has driven foreign companies 
to establish JVs with local companies. However, in many cases Sino-foreign JVs have not lived 
up to the expectations of the foreign investors.
The Rise of Wholly Owned Subsidiaries
As FDI into China has increased significantly over the last two decades the attitudes of 
Chinese authorities have gradually become more open towards WFOEs, restrictions have been 
gradually removed and new industries have been opened for WFOEs. At the same time the 
legislation concerning FDI has been improved, which decreases ambiguity and the risk of 
investing. Over the years foreign companies have also gained more experience of the Chinese 
market and may have become more confident of entering the Chinese markets alone. 
Undoubtedly, WFOEs as an operation mode gives companies more flexibility and control in 
management.
Luo (2001) suggests that a major factor underlying the change is that an increasing number of 
pioneering investors already in China have employed wholly owned ventures as a form of 
reinvestment. It is also likely that those new investors who have gained experience and 
knowledge from early entrants will consider using wholly owned subsidiaries as an entry mode.
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According to Luo (2001) those without experience, either direct or indirect, still need to opt for 
a joint venture.
Over the past two decades China has gone through major economic and political changes. "The 
Chinese have made great strides in adapting to the western mindset, and environment now 
exists in which foreign managers can realistically envision greater control over their Chinese 
operations and seriously consider the creation of a WFOE, a strategy previously not thought 
realistic" (Wong et al. 1999, 12). It looks certain that in the near future the share of WFOEs in 
China continues to increase and the Chinese government continues opening more industries for 
WFOEs. "However, China's vastly different culture, language, business climate, and political 
environment is still a challenge for foreign companies, and thus for many companies the joint 
venture maybe still be the best way to acquire the necessary' familiarity with China's market 
conditions" (Wong et al. 1999, 12).
Figure 4-1: Summary: Why WFOEs have become more popular in China?
Entering Firms Joint Ventures
-have gained experience of China - often pose managerial problems
through other operations modes - often end up in problems when
such as representative offices and objectives develop into different
JVs directions
- have learned indirectly from the - pose the thread of technology
experiences of other firms leakage
-wantfiexibility and full control of - were popular when the WFOE
the operations option was restricted and firms had 
little experience of China
Increasing number of WFOEs
Host Country Environment
-Over the years many restrictions concerning WFOEs have been remomed 
-Over the years many incentives to JVs have been removed 
- Legislation and infrastructure have improved
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5 MULTIPLE CASE STUDIES ON FINNISH COMPANIES
At the moment some 160 Finnish companies do business in China. Finnish companies have 
around 60 production facilities in China, of which around one third are wholly owned 
subsidiaries and the rest are joint ventures. The first Finnish company that established a 
production facility in China was Valmet automation with its joint venture in Xian in 1989. The 
rush of Finnish companies into China started around 1993, however, these were still all either 
joint ventures or representative offices. The first Finnish wholly owned company, Neste 
Polyester in Kunshan, was not established until 1996. (Kaislaniemi 2002)
The Finnish WFOEs, as well as the JVs, are mainly located in Beijing-Tianjin area (WFOEs: 
e.g. Metso Minerals Tianjin, Metso Dynapac, Tamglass), Shanghai and the bordering Jiangsu 
province (WFOEs: e.g. Thermo Labsystems, Auramarme Asia, Efore Suzhou Electronics, 
Metso Automation Shanghai, Metso Paper Wuxi, Raflatac, Shanghai Talo Furniture, Wecan 
Electronics, UPM-Kymmene Suzhou Paper Industry), and in the southern Guangdong province 
(WFOEs: e.g. Savcor Coatings, Perlos, Eimo, Guangzhou Novo Technology Development). 
(Kaislaniemi 2002)
In this chapter I will first shortly introduce the six Finnish wholly owned subsidiaries and their 
operations in China:
5.1.1 Neste Kunshan
5.1.2 Shanghai ThermoLabsystems
5.1.3 Wecan Electronics Suzhou
5.1.4 Metso Minerals Tianjin
5.1.5 Guangzhou Novo Technology Development
5.1.6 Kaukomarkkinat
Then in chapter 5.2 follows cross case analysis and a discussion comparing the case 
companies' entry mode choices to the theory.
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5.1 CASE DESCRIPTIONS
5.1.1 Neste Polyester (Kunshan) Co. Ltd.
Neste Kunshan, a subsidiary of Neste Corporation, a factory producing unsaturated polyesters 
paints, was the first Finnish wholly owned enterprise in China. In 1999 Fortum (former Neste 
Corporation) sold the whole Neste Chemicals Division to Swedish Industrie Capital, who in 
turn sold the polyester business to an American company, Ashland, who is the current owner 
of Neste Kunshan.
At the time when Neste Kunshan was established Neste Corporation, was one of the largest 
industrial companies in Scandinavia. Its net sales were FIM 43.375 million in 1996 and it 
employed around 8662 people. Neste Chemicals Division produced and marketed adhesive 
resins, oxo products, unsaturated polyester resins and gelcoats and paper chemicals. In 1996 it 
had 40 production units in 11 countries in Europe, North America and Asia.
Neste Chemicals in China
In 1992 Neste started to study business opportunities in four Asian countries; India, China, 
South Korea and Japan. China was chosen and the planning phase started in 1994. A market 
analysis was carried out and unsaturated polyester paints were selected as the product for the 
Chinese market. The new unit was to serve as a bridgehead to the Chinese market.
In the beginning Neste studied the possibility of having a local Chinese partner. Based on 
Chinese market analysis, a business unit of a large Chinese state-owned company was selected 
as a prospective partner for the joint venture. The joint venture negotiations proceeded far, 
almost to signing of a contract, but towards the end the Neste people started to have doubts. 
The products of the joint venture were to be highly market oriented and needed an effective and 
customer oriented management system, not the management system and structure of Chinese 
state-owned companies.
"It [the negotiations] started to feel so tiresome and difficult. And when drafting 
the joint venture contract was so difficult you started to think how difficult the 
management of the joint venture would be. ” (Sierla 2002)
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As the new unit is China was planned to be rather small, the joint venture form would have 
burdened the unit with too much administrative matters. The Neste management was also very 
aware of the fact that although the cooperation was working in the beginning, often the 
objectives of joint venture partners develop into different directions over time and the JV ends 
up in problems.
In addition, the people at Neste realized that unlike to what they had thought in the beginning 
there was not necessarily a need for a Chinese joint venture partner. The products of the 
planned unit is China were to be unsaturated polyester pamts that are mainly used in reinforced 
plastic industry to coat products such as boats. The customers in this sector were mainly small 
so-called “village industry” companies, but also big state-owned companies and some big 
Japanese and Korean firms operating in China. During the JV negotiations Neste realized that 
this market was completely free of any governmental control.
“After a while we realized that this industry is no ways controlled by the 
authorities. There would have been no use to us to have a partner, that could have 
brought some connections to authorities. ” “The customers make their purchase 
decisions by comparing the price with the product and services, just like anywhere 
else. "(Sierla 2002)
” If you choose a joint venture, you have to define in detail what is the contribution 
that the partner would bring to the venture. If it 's nothing substantial, then you 
should do it alone. If you don Y have guts to do it alone, then you better not do it at 
all. ” (Sierla 2002)
It was then that Neste Chemicals started to study the possibility of having a wholly owned 
subsidiar}'. The Kunshan Economic and Industrial Zone near Shanghai was particularly 
attractive to Neste Chemicals. There was no wholly foreign-owned company from the western 
countries in the Zone yet. However, the local government showed a strong interest and a high 
level of support towards the wholly owned factory project of Neste. Neste was also able to hire 
a very capable Chinese person, a manager at a local paint factory who later became the CEO 
of the Neste Kunshan. With the new Chinese manager Neste had all the needed local know­
how to start in China without a partner. Furthermore, the investment to be made was quite 
small, only around USD 1 million, and thus the managers of Neste Chemicals felt that they 
could take the risk of diverting from the JV option that was still the “traditional” choice at the 
time.
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“My personal belief is that it is a test to the business idea whether you dare to do it 
alone. Often the idea of establishing a joint venture comes from not having enough 
faith, so you take a partner and think it will be better that way. ” (Sierla 2002)
The Neste Polyester (Kunshan) Co. Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary, received its business 
license in the beginning of 1996. In two years of starting up period, it reached the break-even 
point and was the most profitable unit in the division. The factory employed only around 30 
people.
As mentioned in the beginning Neste Kunshan is nowadays owned by Ashland Corporation. 
And although it is a relatively small unit, the new owner sees it as a valuable bridgehead to 
China.
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5.1.2 Shanghai Thermo Labsystems Co. Ltd.
Thermo Labsystems is a company developing and supplying biotechnology systems, products 
and services primarily for the needs of research and clinical laboratories. Its products include 
pipettes and tips, microplate instruments, microplates, magnetic particle processors, research 
reagents, and diagnostic kits. Since 1997 Thermo Labsystems has been part of to the Life and 
Laboratory Sciences Sector of an American Thermo Electron Corporation (2001 net sales: 
USD 2.2 billion).
In 2001 Labsystems" net sales were USD 82 million and it employed 530 people, of which 430 
are located in Finland. The company’s products are sold through Thermo Bioscience 
Technologies sales units in 13 countries and manufactured in four countries.
Thermo Labsystems consists of two businesses. The Liquid Handling Business designs 
manufactures and markets pipettes, tips, microplates and strips, as well as their accessories. Its 
sales, marketing and R&D teams are located in Vantaa, Finland, and its production mainly in 
Joensuu, Finland, and in Russia and China. The Microplate Instrumentation Business designs, 
manufactures and markets laboratory instruments, research reagents and diagnostic tests. They 
are manufactured in Vantaa and Shanghai, China.
First Joint Venture - Shanghai Feilong Medical Diagnostic Articles
In the mid 1990’s Thermo Labsystems established two joint ventures in China. The first one, 
Shanghai Feilong Medical Diagnostic Articles Co. Ltd, was establishes in 1993 with Shanghai 
Institute of Biological Products and Shanghai Kening Developing Company. It produces 
diagnostic chemistry reagents for use at hospitals, clinics and blood centers. Later also 
Finnfund1 invested in the venture. The ownership was divided so that Thermo Labsystems, 
Finnfund and Shanghai Institute of Biological Products each had roughly a share of one third, 
while the Shanghai Kening had a smaller share of 2%.
The Shanghai Feilong JV was a failure. The venture did not really ever get properly started. 
For a long time the JV partners were arguing over the management of the venture, most
1 Finnfund is an investment finance corporation owned by the State of Finland, business and industry, and Finnish 
Export Credit Ltd. It provides equity capital, long-term investment loans and guarantees for profitable enterprises in 
emerging countries. It also ofiters advisory services and participates in projects and training in companies in which it 
has an equity stake.
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importantly over the transfer of technology. By the time some kind of agreement was reached 
in 1997, Chinese competitors had already taken over the market at much lower prices, and thus 
the original business plan of the venture was not feasible anymore. After that. Thermo 
Labsystems has tried to find a buyer for their share. Eventually part of the share was sold. 
Finnfund has no longer investment in the venture and Thermo Labsystems now carries only 
25%. It does not investment money or resources to the venture anymore.
Second Joint Venture - Shanghai Thermo Labsystems
In 1995 Thermo Labsystems established a second joint venture, Shanghai Thermo Labsystems, 
together with Finnfiind and Shanghai Medical Analytic Instrument Factory (SMAIF). The 
Fimiish side had a majority ownership in the venture, Thermo Labsystems 32,5 % and 
Finnfiind 32,5 %, while the Chinese partner had 35%. (Sipilä 1996)
The JV partner, SMAIF, was a state-owned company belonging to a pharmaceutical group and 
thus close to the Shanghai Pharmaceutical Bureau. Its total sales were RMB 38 million (less 
than USD 5 million) in 1993 although its employees amounted to 700 people. The SMAIF was 
chosen as a partner because its distribution channels for its own product (freeze dryer 
products) seemed effective for the joint venture. Also, SMAIF had experience of cooperation 
with other western producers. (Sipilä 1996)
The Shanghai Thermo Labsystems factory assembled pipettes, electronic pipettes, disposable 
pipettes and microplates. The total investment of the company was USD 1,6 million. Thermo 
Labsystems was responsible for providing the technology and the equipment for the venture, 
while SMAIF provided the building, land-use rights and cash. Finnfund came in with a cash 
investment. (Sipilä, 1996)
Before establishing the two JVs in China Thermo Labsystems did not have any experience 
doing business in China, except for the general manager of the company who had been 
involved in China venture in Russia, which was very successful, and joint projects also in 
Pakistan and India. The experiences of especially the Russian venture were an encouragement 
for setting up the Chinese ventures. Investing in China was motivated by the large and growing 
market in China, high trade barriers, need for setting up own distribution channels in China 
and cheap labour costs.
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The possibility of a wholly owned subsidiary was also considered in the early stages. However, 
the conclusion to form a joint venture was motivated by the view that the company lacked 
suitable personnel to run the company itself. (Sipilä 1996) Furthermore, Thermo Labsystems' 
managers saw potential difficulties in marketing, bureaucracy, technology transfer and 
language, if it was to run the company without a partner. Therefore the management saw it 
was in their interest to find a local partner in order to achieve faster market entry and create 
networks with potential clients and important officers. However, after starting the operations 
the sales channels of SMAIF did not prove to be effective.
"There where all kinds of problems. Everyone there [in China] wants to be a 
partner [in a Sino-foreign JV], mostly they are state-owned companies. First they 
promise you heaven and earth, but in the end the reality is nothing but problems. 
In a wholly owned subsidiary you don't have that kind of burdens. But that was the 
time when you had JVs, there were no other choices ”. (Paasonen 2002)
A more detailed description of the joint venture negotiations and the organization of the two 
JVs can be found in Sipilä’s (1996) work.
Changing to a WFQE Mode
Also the Shanghai Thermo Labsystems JV ended up in managerial disagreements very soon. 
The main issue was transfer pricing. The components for the assembly of the pipettes were 
imported from Finland with high prices, and thus the Finnish partner was able to profit out of 
the venture, while the venture itself never started to make good profits. In late 1997 the 
disagreement led to a situation were Thermo Labsystems wanted to get out of the venture.
First the Chinese party suggested that the ownership on the Chinese side would be lifted to a 
higher level in the government owned Pharmaceutical group, giving the JV a more powerful 
partner on the Chinese side. However, after four months of negotiations it turned out that they 
could not invest am thing to the venture and Thermo Labsystems returned to negotiate with 
SMAIF on termination of the JV.
Fortunately, m August 1998 the partners reached an agreement on the price and SMAIF, as 
well as Finnfund, were bought out. At the same time Shanghai Thermo Labsystems, now a 
wholly owned subsidiary, bought the Chinese company who was the distributor of Thermo 
Labsystems" medical instruments in China. In addition, as the JV had been operating in the 
facilities of SMAIF, with the termination of the JV Shanghai Thermo Labsystems moved to
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new facilities in Jiangcha industrial area in Pudong (Shanghai). For the first year and a half the 
factory operated in rented temporary factory space until the new, own, factory was completed 
in 1999.
In the beginning Shanghai Thermo Labsystems produced only pipettes. The production of 
medical instruments was started in 1999 with enormous success. Through the distributor the 
company was able to acquire 50% market share in China, and has both price advantage and 
quality advantage over its competitors. This makes also selling the pipettes easier as Thermo 
Labsystems now has critical mass in China.
In 2001 the turnover of Shanghai Thermo Labsystems was USD 6 million. Both domestic 
(China) and export sales (USD 1,3 million in 2001) are growing. The factory employs 56 
people, and additional 14 people work in marketing.
Future
As for most foreign companies, China’s WTO membership will bring some concessions to the 
operations of Shanghai Thermo Labsystems. The customs duties will decrease and the 
company will gain trading rights, and thus will be able to do importing itself. Thermo 
Labsystems is also looking forward to the reforms in banking, as the WTO will enable foreign 
banks to operate in China. Also, it is hoped that with the new regulations the Chinese officials 
would be better able to hit down the rampant violation of intellectual property rights.
However, the biggest changes in the near future of Shanghai Thermo Labsystems are not those 
brought by the WTO. In the next two years the American owner of Thermo Labsystems is 
planning to make large investments in Shanghai Thermo Labsystems. The plan is to increase 
the capacity of the factory in Shanghai considerably, possibly even ten-fold.
59
5.1.3 Wecan Electronics (Suzhou) Co. Ltd.
Wecan is an international electronics contract manufacturer that produces and sells 
telecommunications products and services to telecommunications system suppliers, in 
particular to manufacturers of wireless (mobile) communications network systems. In 2001 
Wecan's turnover was 46,5 million euros, and it employed around 420 people.
Wecan Group's parent company, Wecan Electronics Oyj, is located in the Finnish town of 
Ylivieska. In addition to Ylivieska, Wecan has manufacturing plants in Estonia (1997) and in 
China (1999), and a service unit in Helsinki. Over the past few years Wecan has been 
internationalization fast. This has also been reflected in the geographical distribution of 
turnover: In 2000, the share of foreign deliveries in turnover rose to as high as 41.6 % (28.3 % 
in 2000).
In 2000 Wecan was listed on the main list of Helsinki Stock Exchange. In the fall of 2002 
Wecan merged with another Finnish electronics contract manufacturer Scanfil and now 
operates under the name Scanfil Oy. However, this case concentrates only on the former 
Wecan Electronics and its operations in China.
Wecan in China
In 1999 Wecan Electronics established a wholly owned manufacturing plant in Suzhou in 
Jiangsu province near Shanghai. Before establishing the faetón,’ in Suzhou Wecan did not have 
any previous experience of China. However, Wecan had some experience of international 
production through its factory in Estonia. The idea behind going to China was to be close to 
the customer Nokia that has a GSM base station and cellular transmission products factory in 
Suzhou. Of course China is also an attractive location because of the lower labour costs.
Wecan Electronics is not the only Finnish company who has followed Nokia to China. In 1999 
four Finnish Nokia subcontractors (Ojala, LK-products, Efore and Wecan Electronics) started 
their operations in Suzhou (Kauppalehti 09.08.1999). Other Finnish companies who have 
followed Nokia to China are Perlos in Guangzhou and Eimo in Shenzhen.
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“We just started to put up the company, didn't do any research before hand. Just 
contacted the park [the Suzhou technology park], the same park where Nokia is. Of 
course we asked a lot of things from Nokia, and got a lot of advice. ” (Aakula 2002)
When planning the operations in China, it was clear from the beginning that the new subsidiar}7 
would be wholly owned. Joint venture mode was never even considered.
"I don Y see any reason why we should have had one [a JVpartner]. It woidd have 
been no use to us. But it would have brought problems for sure. ” (Aakula 2002)
At the moment the factory employs some 100 people, with two expatriates, Finnish production 
manager and general manager. The turnover of the subsidiar}' in China is about 7 million 
euros, 20 % of the total. Although the whole business in China was first based on 
subcontracting for Nokia, now the sales to Nokia account only for 40%. Other big customers 
in China are e.g. Motorola. At the moment the global market is experiencing a downturn that 
has decreased Wecan's sales also in China. Other than that the operations in China are 
functioning as expected.
Starting in China
The current CEO of Wecan Electronics, Pauli Aakula, went to China himself to put up the 
operations there. In the very early stages he hired a Chinese manager, together with whom they 
started the process getting a business license, putting up the factory and recruiting the Chinese 
staff.
According to Aakula (2002) everything went smoothly in the establishing period, especially 
dealing with the local authorities was made easy.
"We only had the [Suzhou technology] park as an interface [with the authorities]. 
They had all instances represented there. And they handled everything smoothly. 
Just one office for everything. ” (Aakula 2002)
"The fact that we went there to support Nokia 's operations helped a lot in getting 
things done. ” (Aakula 2002)
Of course, also the help and advice from Nokia was crucial in the beginning. In the beginning 
Wecan also used the services of a Shanghai law firm in getting the business license. Other than 
that, everything was done alone. Aakula (2002) emphasizes that there is no sense in the
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argument of choosing the joint venture form just to get local know-how. In his opinion, local 
know how can be acquired by hiring and just going to China and start learning.
“That [local knowledge] comes with the people you hire. 1 don Y see how a joint 
venture partner could contribute anything. Especially as we followed Nokia. ” 
(Aakula 2002)
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5.1.4 Metso Minerals (Tianjin) Co. Ltd.
Metso Corporation was created through the merger of Valmet and Rauma in 1999. Metso is a 
global supplier of process industry machinery' and systems, as well as know-how and 
aftermarket services. The Corporation's core businesses are fiber and paper technology (Metso 
Paper), rock and mineral processing (Metso Minerals) and automation and control technology 
(Metso Automation). Metso's net sales were 4343 million euros in 2001, and it employed 30 
424 people.
With 2 joint ventures, 3 wholly owned subsidiaries, 10 sales/representative offices and 1 
technology and service center, Metso Corporation is one of Finnish companies with most 
operations in China. It employs more than 1900 people in China (excluding the JV personnel).
Metso Minerals
Metso Minerals develops, designs and delivers equipment and total solutions for the drilling, 
crushing, grinding, beneficiation, screening and transport of rock and other minerals. The main 
products are crushers, screens, mining equipment, grinding mills, wear products, conveying 
equipment and asphalt pavers and rollers. The main customer segments are quarries, mines and 
civil engineering contractors.
Metso Minerals' net sales were 913 million euros in 2001, a 63 percent increase from previous 
year. The increase in net sales was mainly due to Metso Corporation acquiring the Swedish 
Svedala Industri AB, one of its biggest competitors, in September 2001.
Metso Minerals has sales and service units, agents and distributors in 150 countries, and 
manufacturing facilities in Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, India, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Peru, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the USA.
The Beginning - Metso Joint Ventures in China
The companies that nowadays belong to the Metso Corporation exported their first products to 
China already in the 1950s. The first production unit was established in 1989. This JV, Valmet
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Xian Paper Machinen’ Co. Ltd., in Xian was also the first Finnish owned production unit in 
China. A second JV, Shanghai Ne les Jamesbury Valve Co. Ltd., was established in Shanghai 
in 1994. The both JVs were typical 50-50 JVs of that time. The Valmet Xian operation was a 
tough learning experience. It suffered from all classic problems and mistakes of early JVs in 
China, and it took nearly ten years before the unit got its operations to a satisfactory level. The 
Shanghai Neles Jamesbury operation was more successful. Nevertheless, although at the 
moment both JVs are at a satisfactory level they are still "just joint ventures - not our 
[Metso's] own businesses”, and "we [Metso] have tried to get rid of the Shanghai JV, but it is 
impossible” (Hallamaa 2002).
Metso Minerals Tianjin Co. Ltd.
Metso Minerals started its China operations in 1991 with a subsidiary in Hong Kong, and a 
representative office in Beijing in 1993. In the mid 1990s Metso Minerals made some very 
large deliveries in China, especially to the Three Gorges Dam construction site on Yangtze 
River. The market in China looked promising and after some market studies Metso decided in 
1996 to start manufacturing in China. The preparations started in 1997, and in 1999 Metso 
Minerals Tianjin Co. Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary, started operations.
After Metso Minerals Tianjin production unit, a network of sales offices was established in 
China (Beijing, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Chengdu).
Metso Minerals Tianjin is located in TEDA (Tianjin Economic and Development Area) in 
Tianjin, a large industrial city near Beijing. The company itself employs around 40 people, but 
when taking into account the subcontractors the total number rise to 300-400 people. The 
customers of Metso Minerals are both state-owned and municipal, as well as private 
companies; quarries, mines and civil engineering contractors.
Other Metso Units in China
After Metso Minerals Tianjin, also Metso Automation started a wholly owned subsidiary in 
Shanghai. Metso Automation Shanghai Co. Ltd. is located in a free trade zone and produces 
also for export to other Asian countries.
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The third Metso wholly owned unit in China is Metso Dynapac. This former competitor 
located in Wuxing near Tianjin, became part of Metso Minerals through the Svedala 
acquisition in 2001. Lastly, Metso Paper opened a technology and service center, Metso Paper 
Wuxi Co. Ltd. (also a wholly owned unit), near Shanghai in 2001.
In addition to the 2 JVs, 4 WFOEs and 1 technology and service center, Metso Corporation 
has altogether around 10 sales/representative offices in China.
Wholly Foreign Owned Subsidiary
One of the most important reasons for starting production in China was the fact that the local 
companies wrho buy with local currency can only buy products made in China. As China has 
tight currency restrictions, few small quarries and smaller mining companies have access to 
foreign currency. For larger companies Metso Mineral sells also imported machinery, with 
dollars, through the representative offices. These are e.g. large mining companies buying large 
pieces of machinery, and their purchases are often financed by organizations such as Asian 
Development Bank.
The reason for choosing the wholly owned subsidiary mode for Metso Minerals rather than a 
JV is mostly due to fact that the investment environment in China has changed. In the late 
1980s when Valmet Xian was established, JV was the only possibility. Later in early 1990s 
when Shanghai Neles Jamesbury Valve started the wholly owned subsidiary was already an 
option utilized by few investors, but JV was still seen as the only feasible option by most 
companies. Since the late 1990s the JV option was not even considered anymore when starting 
Metso Minerals Tianjin, Metso Automation Shanghai and Metso Paper Wuxi.
"We have tried all these different concepts: we have JVs. representative offices and
wholly owned subsidiaries. That is our Metso background in China........... Today 1
woidd not establish a JV no matter what, unless it 's absolutely necessary. Our JVs 
are nowadays doing ok. but they are not our systems. They are JVs. I can't think of 
any reason why one woidd want to have a JV these days ". (Hallamaa 2002)
Also, Metso Minerals' business sector is categorized as '“encouraged" in the Investment 
Guidance Catalogue of the State Planning Commission. This, and the fact that Metso 
Minerals' products are high-tech in their own category, has made dealing with Chinese 
officials easy.
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Metso Minerals' position in China is good at the moment. Metso was lucky to be the first 
company in its business sector to enter China, three years ahead of its worst global competitor 
Svedala, that Metso later acquired in 2001. The head start is an important advantage. For 
Metso Minerals the first years of 96-97 in China were learning period, after which the 
company's China strategy was redesigned. After that getting the market share has been just 
hard, patient, long-term oriented work. In the future competition is likely to harder. The WTO 
will lower customs duties and bring more imported products to the market. As such , the WTO 
will not have great influence on Metso's operations in China. Also, it is likely that some 
government supported local Chinese competitors may emerge.
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5.1.5 Guangzhou Novo Technology Development Co. Ltd.
Novo Group is a Finnish IT company whose business areas include software services, IT 
operating and network services, and hardware services for both corporate and public sectors. 
Novo Group's net sales were 295 million euros in 2001, and it employs over 2000 IT- 
professionals.
Novo has foreign subsidiaries in six countries, in Estonia, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, 
the USA and China. Foreign operations accounted for approximately 6.9 % of net sales in 
2001. There are approximately 130 employees at foreign units.
Joint Venture - Beijing Novo Information Technology Co. Ltd
Novo's business in China started initially in the early 1990"s when Novo's employees started 
traveling in and out of China working on many projects. The first investment was made in 
August 1999, when Novo Group established a joint venture, Beijing Novo Information 
Technology Co. Ltd, together with Beijing China SIWEI Surveying and Mapping Technology, 
a governmental institution. Novo Group has a majority (65%) ownership in the joint venture, 
while the China SIWEI holds 15%. In addition, as in many Finnish joint ventures in China, 
Finnfund2 has a 20% share in the venture.
The joint venture's products are map applications built on satellite imaging and GIS 
(Geographical Information System). This software, developed to generate digital terrain 
models required especially for designing telecommunications networks, can be used in network 
planning all over the world. Currently Beijing Novo employs around 20-30 people.
Wholly Owned Subsidiary - Guangzhou Novo Technology Development Co. Ltd.
Right from the beginning, inside the Beijing joint venture, started also a team of people that 
were working for the Novo Group Infra Solutions Division. The Novo Infra Solutions 
Division provides comprehensive service relating to the infrastructure of information 
technology, including e g. planning, consultation and product services, services designed to
" Finnfund is an investment finance corporation owned by the State of Finland, business and industry, and Finnish 
Export Credit Ltd. It provides equity capital, long-term investment loans and guarantees for profitable enterprises in 
emerging countries. It also offfers advisory services and participates in projects and training in companies in which it 
has an equity stake.
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secure the safe and reliable use of hardware, networks and data communications facilities, as 
well as providing the customers with the software and hardware. Approximately 10 percent of 
the division's personnel are engaged in client projects abroad.
Expansion into the Chinese market is a part of Novo’s internationalization strategy, according 
to which the primary goal of the Infra Solutions Division is to expand its operations outside 
Finland in its core areas of expertise, i.e. in expert design, installation and operation services of 
the systems critical for the customers business operations. For the Chinese market, Infra 
Solutions selected a few central products that it started to sell. The idea was to start gradually 
and to get a feel of the market.
However, very soon after the beginning it became clear that the joint venture form brought 
certain limitations to the operations of the Infra Division. This is because even if Novo has 
majority ownership in the joint venture it does not give right to make decisions alone. The joint 
venture law in China requires that both partners in the venture must authorize all decisions. 
This requirement brought certain bureaucracy to the operations, whereas the Infra Division's 
business area required the ability to respond fast and make quick decisions.
It was therefore decided that the Infra Division should be separated form the Beijing Novo as a 
separate company with a wholly owned mode. Guangzhou, in the southern-most Guangdong 
province, was selected as the location for the new wholly owned subsidiary, as it was not seen 
meaningful to have two units in the same city. The Novo Group board in Finland made a 
decision about the new subsidiary in June 2000, and the Guangzhou Novo Technology 
Development Co. Ltd. got its business license on July 1st 2000. After a few weeks of starting 
arrangements the Infra Division team in Beijing moved to Guangzhou and the new unit was 
fully operational in August 2000. At the moment Novo Guangzhou has some 12 employees. In 
addition there are some people left in the Beijing office working for the Infra Division. 
Majority of the employees are Chinese. Together the Beijing and Guangzhou units have 5 
Finnish expatriates.
Different Business Requires a Different Company Form
The primary reason for having a joint venture form in Beijing and a wholly owned company in 
Guangzhou is the very different nature of the businesses. The business Beijing Novo does,
68
satellite imaging, GIS and related software, is the kind were there is an advantage of having a 
governmental institution as a partner.
“A certain kind of business in China requires that you have a partner, because in 
that way you can get certain contacts. ” (Niukkala, 2002)
“It is very rare that foreign-funded companies are permitted to carry out work 
related to surveying in China. It is also quite new that a foreign corporation 
develops its products specifically for the Chinese market” (Beijing Novo’s General 
Manager Antti Johansson, Novo Group press release Sep 1, 1999)
The products Beijing Novo offers have been developed in co-operation with the Chinese 
counterparts. On the other hand, the business the Novo Infra Division does in China is based 
on a ready concept. The Infra Division is expanding into the Chinese market by duplicating the 
same business concept and the same products and processes that it applies in Finland and other 
countries. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the business of Infra Division requires an ability 
to respond fast and therefore the wholly owned mode was necessary.
Although the Beijing and Guangzhou Novo are now separate companies, the two units still co­
operate closely. Part of the Guangzhou Novo's employees are still located in Beijing and the 
two units do projects together.
Finnish Customers as a Starting Point
The second factor supporting the wholly owned mode is the fact that the customer base was 
already there when Guangzhou Novo started its operations. The target customers of 
Guangzhou Novo are primarily Furnish companies, secondly other Western companies and 
only thirdly Chinese companies. Many of the Finnish customers are also Novo's customers in 
Finland. Therefore, it was not crucial to Guangzhou Novo to have the connections and the 
experience of how to deal with Chinese customers, that is often the argument for selecting the 
joint venture mode.
“Our main focus is the western companies in China. This is our starting strategy. 
It is an advantage that we don Y even have to start selling to Chinese customers. 
They come gradually after some time ” (Niukkala, 2002)
From the customer perspective the strength of Novo Guangzhou is that they can offer the same 
service in China as in Europe. Being able to work with a familiar IT company with reliable,
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customer oriented and high quality service brings value added to Finnish companies who 
operate in China, where the challenges of the special characteristics of the environment often 
cause headaches to foreign businesses.
”In China there are a lot of those one man IT-companies. But you never know 
whether they still exist tomorrow. And you don't know what their background is. 
That is a risk for many companies. And IT is something that companies want to 
protect well, not openly show it to the whole world. ” (Niukkala, 2002)
Success factors
After two years of operating Guangzhou Novo is starting to reach the point where the initial 
investment has been recovered and the subsidiary is starting to make money. According to 
Niukkala (2002) that is a little faster than the typical 3-year break-even time of foreign 
invested companies in China.
The two factors for success that Niukkala (2002) emphasized are knowledge of local ways of 
doing things and recruitment. In Guangzhou Novo’s case the operations started inside the 
Beijing joint venture, which made it possible to find the local employees and learn the way of 
running a company in China before putting up the wholly owned subsidiary in Guangzhou. 
According to Niukkala (2002) some foreign companies have established wholly owned 
subsidiaries without having any Chinese employees or experience. But they have soon ended 
up in trouble, having to hire employees in haste and not having the knowledge of how to handle 
the administrative matters.
"If you have experience of China, it is possible to have a wholly owned subsidiary, 
and to do it rationally and successfully. But without local knowledge, how ever you 
acquire it. by recruiting or in some other way. you will need it. ” (Niukkala, 2002)
In the near future Guangzhou Novo’s strategy is to continue gradual growth, expanding the 
product categories in China according to the wishes of the customer. China’s WTO 
membership will not directly affect Guangzhou Novo, however, it will most probably increase 
foreign investment into China and in that way increase both business and competition.
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5.1.6 Kaukomarkkinat
Kaukomarkkinat is a leading Finnish trading house operating internationally. It has over 20 
subsidiaries or representative offices in 14 countries. The company is owned by Kesko Oy and 
in 2001 its turnover was 1727,5 million euros. Kaukomarkkinat specializes in international 
technical trading, the import and wholesale of the world's leading branded products (e.g. 
Panasonic, Technics, Adidas, Citizen) as well as the import, manufacture and marketing of 
high-quality optics.
International Technical Trading
International technical trading is the largest business sector of Kaukomarkkinat and one of its 
strongest areas of expertise. The key product groups in technical trading include machines, raw 
materials and accessories, and products for the food, forest, electronics, plastics and packaging 
industries. The best-known part of international technical trading is Kauko East-West Trade, 
which is doing business mainly in China, Central and Eastern Europe and Russia. The 
operations in China and Russia make up about 90% of Kauko East-West Trade's business.
Kaukomarkkinat in China
Kaukomarkkinat was one of the first Finnish companies doing business is China. The business 
started in 1952, only three years after the founding of the People's Republic of China, with 
exporting of pulp, and continued in 1955-57 with exporting of five cargo ships together with 
Wärtsilä.
At the moment Kaukomarkkinat has two representative offices in China. The first one was 
established in the early 1980's in Beijing, and the second in the turn of the 1990's in Shanghai. 
Later a representative office was also established in Guangzhou, but it was closed down in 
2000, at the same time when a subsidiary' opened in neighboring Hong Kong. The 
representative offices in China employ around 40 people. In addition there are 6 employees in 
the head office in Finland, who handle administrative matters, financing and contacts to clients.
In China Kaukomarkkinat operates in four main sectors. Pulp and paper industry is the biggest 
sector. In the 1980's Kaukomarkkinat represented major Finnish pulp and paper machinery' 
producers such as Valmet, Rauma Repola and Strömberg. Nowadays Kaukomarkkinat sells
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machinery and equipment of such Finnish producers as Vaahto, Quatrol, Aqua and Larox. The 
second, nowadays fast growing, sector is medical equipments. Kaukomarkkinat provides 
hospitals with special equipments for intensive care, surgery, laboratories hospital rooms and 
dental care. The main principal is Instrumentarium in Finland, but Kaukomarkkinat represents 
also some producers in the USA and Japan. The third sector is environmental technology', 
where Kaukomarkkinat sells machinery for wastewater treatment, dredgers for waterway 
maintenance and waste management. The fourth sector is shipbuilding. The customers of 
Kaukomarkkinat in China are state-owned companies, or provincial or communal entities.
WTO Makes a Wholly Foreign Owned Trading Companies Possible
The idea of an own subsidiary in China is not new to Kaukomarkkinat. The possibility of 
having a subsidiary in China has been considered many times over the years. However, so far 
it has been nearly impossible as the law in China prohibits foreign companies to do trading in 
China. Trading companies, as defined by Chinese law, are firms solely engaged in the import 
and export of products; they do no manufacturing of their own. Until relatively recently, only 
Chinese state-owned trading companies could import and export goods to and from China. 
(Zeng 2002)
“Foreign companies were first allowed to establish trading companies in China in 1996. 
They could do so only through joint ventures in which the Chinese partner held a 
controlling equity interest, according to the Tentative Measures for the Establishment of 
Pilot Sino-Foreign Trade Companies (Tentative Measures), issued by the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) and the State Economic and Trade 
Commission (SETC). Other stringent requirements in the Tentative Measures included 
mandates that foreign companies have at least $5 billion in total sales the year before they 
apply and $30 million in average trade volume with the PRC in each of the previous three 
years. Chinese partners, meanwhile, were required to have an average import-export 
volume of $200 million for three consecutive years before they applied, with an export 
volume of at least $100 million. These joint venture trading companies had to have 
registered capital of at least Y100 million ($12.1 million), which had to be paid up 
according to a schedule that is much shorter than that of typical Chinese-foreign joint 
ventures. Because of these restrictions, only five joint venture trading companies have 
reportedly been established in China since 1996. all located in either the Pudong District of 
Shanghai or the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in Guangdong, as required by the 
Tentative Measures.” (Zeng 2002)
Therefore, so far Kaukomarkkinat has been forced to operate in China through representative 
offices that are not allowed to carry out any business transactions, but only to represent the 
company. However, this will all change with China's WTO membership. China's accession 
agreement to WTO stipulates that foreign companies will receive trading rights after the 
transition period.
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In November 2001 Kaukomarkkinat announced that it would establish a subsidiary in China as 
soon as the transition period ends in 2004 (Kauppalehti 29.11.2001). This will bring many 
changes in the way Kaukomarkkinat does business in China. For example, at the moment 
Kaukomarkkinat is not allowed to import anything to the country. When Kaukomarkkinat sells 
machinery and equipment to China, either the customer imports the goods or Kaukomarkkinat 
uses a licensed Chinese export-import company, who of course charges for the importing 
service. Also, at the moment foreign trading companies are not allowed to have any 
warehouses of their own in China. Neither can they seek trade finance in China, accept local 
currency as payment or involve in domestic trade in China. (Saastamoinen, 2002)
"An own subsidiary brings us competitive advantage. In the first place it helps us 
to compete with the local Chinese companies. And when the number of foreign 
companies grows, we have to structure our operations so that we are in a good 
competitive position. ” (Saastamoinen 2002)
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5.2 ANALYSIS
5.2.1 Cross Case Analysis
All of the case companies had some things in common. They were all subsidiaries of medium 
sized or large Finnish companies, who operate in business-to-business market. All of the case 
companies had invested in China to pursue a market share in China and were selling their 
products (mainly) to the Chinese market. Thus, they were not using China only as a cheap 
production location for export.
Table 5-1: Summary Table of the Case Companies
Company Year when 
WFOE 
established
Earlier 
operations in 
China
Products Size Customers in China
Neste
Kunshan
1996 (first 
Finnish WFOE 
in China)
None (Neste
Chemicals
Division)
Unsaturated 
polyester paints
-Investment:
USD 1 million 
-Employees: ~30
Both state-owned, 
municipal and private 
local companies
Shanghai
Thermo
Labsystems
1998 Chinese 
partner bought 
out of the .TV
- JV: Shanghai 
Feilong in 1993
- JV: Shanghai 
Labsystems in 
1995
Pipettes and
medical
instruments
-Turnover 
(2001): USD 6 
million
-Employees: ~70
Both state-owned, 
municipal and private 
local companies. 
Export -20 %
Wecan
Electronics
Suzhou
1999 None Contract
manufacturing of 
wireless 
communications 
network systems
-Turnover 
(2001): USD 7 
million 
-Employees:
-100
First only Nokia, 
later also other 
companies in the 
electronics business
Metso
Minerals
Tianjin
1999 - JV: Valmet
Xian Paper 
Machinery in
1989
- JV: Shanghai 
Neles Jamesbury 
Valve 1994
- Representative 
offices
Rock crushers, 
mining 
equipment, 
asphalt pavers 
and rollers
-Employees: ~40 Both state-owned and 
municipal, as well as 
private local 
companies
Guangzhou
Novo
Technology
Development
2000 - JV: in Beijing 
since 1999
Software,
consulting
-Employees: -12 Mainly Furnish and 
other western 
companies
Kauko­
markkinat
2004 (?) - 50 years
- At the moment 
representative 
offices in Beijing 
and Shanghai
Machinery and 
equipment for 
forest industry, 
shipbuilding, 
health care and 
environmental
Mainly state-owned 
companies, and 
provincial or 
communal entities
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technology
When one looks at the reasons the case companies gave for selecting the WFOE mode, one can 
find examples of all the factors presented in the framework (chapter 4.3).
Entering firms and their experience:
Four out of six of the case companies (Metso, ThermoLabsystems, Novo Group, and 
Kaukomarkkinat) had previous experience of China, either through joint ventures or 
representative offices. Wecan Electronics started in China as Nokia’s subcontractor. As 
Wecan had had both a customer and an advisor in China there was no need for earlier 
experience. Neste Kunshan was the only one of the case companies that started in China alone 
“from scratch".
Joint ventures:
Three of the case companies (Metso, ThermoLabsystems, Novo Group) had joint venture(s) in 
China before the WFOE. Some of these JVs were complete failures, others relatively 
successful. However, all of these companies mentioned the difficulties of JV management as 
one of the reasons why they chose the WFOE mode for their new units in China. Also, the case 
companies that did not have an own JV in China (Neste, Wecan Electronics, Kaukomarkkinat) 
all mentioned that the well-known difficulties in JV management as one reason for selecting the 
WFOE mode.
Host country environment - foreign investment policy:
The influence of China’s foreign investment policy can be discerned when one examines the 
case companies and their entry mode choices over the past twenty years. In the 1980’s joint 
venture was in practice the only option for foreign investors (see case Metso: Valmet Xian 
Paper Machines). In the early 1990’s the foreign investment policy in China started to change 
in the favour of wholly owned subsidiaries. However, although the number of wholly owned 
subsidiaries started to increase, many companies still opted for joint ventures, which was the 
conventional choice (see case Metso: Shanghai Neles Jamesbury Valve, and case 
ThermoLabsystems: Shanghai Feilong and Shanghai ThermoLabsystems). By the end of 
1990's most of the discriminatory policies toward wholly owned subsidiaries have been 
removed and many of the new investors do not even consider the joint venture option when 
planning their operations in China (see case Wecan Electronics, and case Metso Minerals 
Tianjin).
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Table 5-2: Case Companies: reasons for selecting the WFOE mode
Neste Kunshan • First JV fonn was planned, but in the negotiation phase Neste started to get second 
thoughts because the negotiations were tedious. It was thought that the running of tire JV 
would probably be as difficult.
• The market in question was not under any governmental restriction and therefore it was 
seen that there was no need for a partner to provide governmental connections.
• Neste found a good Chinese manager in tire planning phase.
• The investment was not large and therefore Neste drought it could bare the risk.
Shanghai
Thenno
Labsystems
• Labsystems started in China with two JVs: Shanghai Feilong in 1993 and Shanghai 
Labsystems in 1995. Tire Shanghai Feilong JV was a failure.
• The partners of Shanghai Labsystems had disagreements over tire management of the 
venture. Finally as Labsystems was acquired by American Thermo Electron, it was 
decided that the JV must go. In 1998 Labsystems bought out the Chinese partner in 
Shanghai Labsystems, and thus it became a WFOE. Tire factory was moved to new 
facilities and Labsystems also bought a distributor in China.
Wecan
Electronics
Suzhou
• The wholly owned mode was a self-evident. JV fonn was never even considered. It was 
seen as bureaucratic and difficult. Wecan did not see anything that it could have gained 
from having a partner.
• Wecan went to China to contract-manufacture for Nokia, thus it had both a customer and 
an advisor in China.
Metso Minerals 
Tianjin
• Metso (at that time Valmet) was the first Finnish company to have a production unit 
(JV) in China, Valmet Xian Paper Machinery irr 1989. A second JV was made in 1994, 
Shanghai Neles Janresbury Valve.
• When putting up the Metso Murerais hr Tianjin in 1999 the joint venture option was not 
even considered anymore. The environment in China had changed over the years and JV 
was not see as a viable option anymore.
Guangzhou
Novo
Technology
Development
• The bureaucracy of the JV form turned out to be unsuitable for the business. Infra 
Divisions business needed an ability to make faster decisions.
• The customer base existed. Customers are mainly Finnish and other western companies.
• Novo already had some experience through the JV of how to run business in China.
• The infra division had already started its operations inside the JV. It was not starting 
from scratch.
Kaukomarkkina
t
• Kaukomarkkinat has a 50-year history in China. However, so far the legislation in China 
has prohibited it from having a wholly owned subsidiary. So far Kaukomarkkinat has 
operated in China through representative offices.
• China’s WTO membership will make it possible for Kaukomarkkinat to establish a 
subsidiary after the transition period. This will bring a many improvements in the way 
Kaukomarkkinat does business in China.
5.2.2 Case Examples Compared with the Entry Mode Theories
All of the entry mode theories presented in chapter 3 have some explanatory value when 
analyzing the case examples. But what makes it difficult to analyze the applicability of each of 
the theories is the fact that the companies' entry mode choices were limited by legislation. Only 
the bargaining power theory takes into account the possibility that companies are not able to 
choose their entry modes freely. The bargaining power theory applies well to the China of 
1980‘s and early 1990"s, when foreign companies compromised for the joint venture mode in
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order to be able to enter China. The bargaining has also been done on a macro level (e g. 
between China and WTO) as described by Ramamurti (2001) (see chapter 3.4).
In four of the case examples (Metso, ThermoLabsystems, Novo and Kaukomarkkinat) one can 
see the kind of incremental increase in involvement in China as described by the 
internationalization model. The transaction cost theory applies better to the two case 
companies (Neste and Wecan) that started in China directly with a wholly owned subsidiary. 
As described in chapter 3.5, the key difference between internationalization model and 
transaction cost approach is their stance toward uncertainty. According to internationalization 
model companies react to uncertainty by proceeding incrementally, while according to 
transaction cost view companies react to uncertainty by seeking better control of the 
operations. Better control of the operations was one of the key factors in all of these cases. It 
was the most important factor for Neste and Wecan who chose the wholly owned subsidiary 
mode from the beginning. And it was the reason why Metso, ThermoLabsystems and Novo 
have moved to wholly owned subsidiaries after first operating through joint ventures.
5.2.3 Discussion on Important Factors Arising from the Case Studies
Local Know How
All interviewees emphasized that although it is crucial to have local know how, that should not 
be the reason for choosing a joint venture mode. Local know how is clearly important but 
there are other ways to acquire it, such as hiring local managers, using consultants and agents 
and just going to China and start gathering information little by little.
"If I think now afterwards how should a company with no experience go there 
[China] . . . based on my experience I would give an advice just to spend time 
there and meet all kinds of people, and either find a good consultant or a local 
recruit, and then just start from there. The fact that Chinese companies have 
people who know China is not a good enough reason to choose a joint venture. It 
[starting a wholly owned subsidiary] is just preparations and fact finding. ” (Sierla 
2002)
As one of the interviewees stated: ”If you choose a joint venture, you have to define in detail 
what is the contribution that the partner would bring to the venture. If it's nothing substantial, 
then you should do it alone” (Sierla 2002). If the joint venture does not offer any significant
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Strategie or competitive advantages (see chapter 3.1) and if the partners do not have a good fit 
(see theoretical framework in chapter 3.5), forming a JV just to gain local know how seems too 
big a sacrifice. As one of the interviewees put it:
"Joint venture contracts are usually drafted for 30-50 years. It's like marriage. 
Once you get in to it. that 's it then, difficult to get out or change anything!. ” 
(Paasonen 2002)
Dealing With Chinese Officials
Taking care of administrative matters, getting licenses and dealing with Chinese officials 
naturally requires experience of local habits and bureaucracy. However, after one becomes 
familiar with the system, all the interviewees had mainly good things to say about Chinese 
officials. While “back in the old days” the communist style bureaucracy may have been a big 
hurdle for conducting business in China, according to many of the interviewees today the 
Chinese officials have totally different attitudes.
“Back in the old days” the government and local officials task was to keep a strict control on 
all foreign activities in China. JVs were mostly formed with state-owned companies and it was 
the local and governmental officials who usually suggested prospective JV partners for foreign 
companies. Chinese officials often had their fingers in everything, keeping foreign investors in 
their control and trying to get all possible financial gain from them. Little by little as the FDI 
restriction in China have been loosened and the local officials have learned the benefits of FDI, 
the attitudes have changed. Today the different regions in China are competing with each other 
for foreign investors. Especially in technology parks and other areas that try to attract foreign 
investment, dealing with business licenses etc. have been tried to make as easy as possible
”In China local officials are often appreciated based on how much foreign 
companies they have been able to attract". (Hallamaa 2002)
Most of the interviewees saw that today the governmental and local officials in China are very 
flexible and often helpful in trying to find ways facilitate foreign companies business activities. 
For example, still few years ago the legislation required that WFOEs must be “high-tech” 
companies and that they must export 50% of their production. However, according to the 
interviewees the local authorities are very' flexible in interpreting these rules to the benefit of
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the foreign investors. This all suggests that it is much easier for foreign companies to start 
operations in China today than it was before.
Hybrid Company Forms
None of the case companies clearly utilized a hybrid company form (some kind of combination 
of joint venture and wholly owned subsidiary- form) as described in chapter 4.2.3. Guangzhou 
Novo could be described as a hybrid form to some extent, but its strategy was emergent, not 
planned. The company started as a unit inside the Novo JV in Beijing and later became a 
separate company with WFOE mode. This clearly made it easier for Novo Group to get started 
with the wholly owned unit. When Guangzhou Novo was formed it was already fully 
functional with employees, products, customers and experience. The two units still operate 
closely together. Also Shanghai ThermoLabsystems started out as a JV and the Chinese 
partner was later bought out. However, that was also a emergent strategy, not a planned one. 
After the JV ended up in managerial problems ThermoLabsystems was very lucky in managing 
to negotiate its partner to sell its share in the venture. The situation could have also ended in a 
deadlock situation, as it has with ThermoLabsystems ' other JV in China, Shanghai Feilong 
Medical Diagnostic Articles.
However, it is evident that the so-called hybrid company forms, especially JVs with silent 
partners, are widely utilized in China. Also, as long as the legislation limits foreign investment 
forms in China foreign investors will continue "to push against the ceilings of the old JV and 
WFOE frameworks, and experiment with the newer, less clearly defined options” (Sutter, 
2000). A good example is the Metso Paper Wuxi Co. Ltd (A WFOE), Metso Paper's 
technology and service center near Shanghai. As foreign companies are not so far allowed to 
have service operations in China, Metso established a technology and service center (R&D and 
technology units are allowed) that also does service. In practice the unit operates as a service 
center.
Joint Ventures
Is the era of joint ventures then over in China? Although the share of wholly owned 
subsidiaries in China has increased dramatically over the last 10 years, and surely will
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continue to increase, there are still markets were joint venture form is necessary. These are the 
sectors were joint venture form is still either required by law (See Appendix 3), or were the 
government has such a high influence (such as telecommunications) that good connections to 
high authorities are crucial.
“The most important thing [in choosing the entry mode] is the market segment 
where you sell the product and its requirements ” (Lukkarinen 2002)
However, the way in which JVs are formed in China is likely to change. In the early days, a 
typical JV was formed with a state owned enterprise, often the partner was chosen according to 
the recommendation of the local government officials.
”7 think the JV will remain used, but so that they are formed according to the 
requirements of the business. And the officials won't have they fingers in the 
companies anymore. ” (Lukkarinen 2002)
Kaislaniemi (2002) suspects that in the future contractual joint ventures (CJV) may gain in 
popularity. A CJV is based on a contract between the partners and does not require forming a 
separate legal company. Therefore, a foreign investor can e.g. agree on marketing and 
distribution cooperation with a Chinese partner on CJV basis while having the manufacturing 
in a wholly owned subsidiary, and thus avoiding the problems of shared control of a equity 
joint venture. This is also why although joint ventures in China have been studied widely, the 
topic is still timely because the environment and the nature of JVs is changing.
However, the era of joint ventures, that was created mainly by the restrictive foreign 
investment policies of the Chinese government is clearly over. In fact, some of the interviewees 
in this study found the idea of a joint venture in China so alien that they suggested a better 
research question: “why would any company still establish a joint venture in China these 
days?”
WTO
All case companies saw that China' s WTO membership will bring positive effects to their 
business in China. They expected it to “make things easier” and to decrease uncertainty. On 
the other hand, competition is likely to increase.
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The effect of the WTO were not very significant to the case companies, because the operated 
in businesses that were not going to face large changes. Except for Kaukomarkkinat, as after 
the WTO transition period China will most likely give trading rights to foreign companies.
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6 SUMMARY
Over the past twenty years China has changed from a closed economy to an important market 
and production location for international companies. From a foreign investors perspective 
China has changed from a strictly regulated country where foreign investment was allowed 
only through joint ventures with Chinese companies, to a more and more open and 
'"normalized"’ market.
In the 1980"s joint venture form was in practice the only option for foreign investors. In the 
early 1990"s the foreign investment policy in China started to change, and although the number 
of wholly owned subsidiaries started to increase, many companies still opted for joint ventures 
because that was the conventional choice. By the end of 1990"s most of the discriminatory 
policies toward wholly owned subsidiaries have been removed and therefore many of the new 
investors do not even consider the joint venture option when planning their operations in China. 
The most important reason for the increase of wholly owned subsidiaries and the decrease of 
joint ventures in China is the changes in legislation and the more permissive foreign investment 
policy. In addition, foreign companies have also gained experience of China, and thus do not 
necessarily need a Chinese partner and the difficult joint venture form anymore.
Theoretical Contributions
As discussed in the literature review part, the question of entry mode decision has been studied 
and discussed widely in the international business literature. Several both complementar}', 
overlapping and partly contradictory conceptual frameworks have been introduced and tested, 
but so far the existing literature has not reached an agreement on which conceptual framework 
should be used. This was already a challenging starting point. Creating a theoretical 
framework for this study was also challenging because most entry mode theories approach the 
question from the perspective of the investing companies, assessing only their experience, 
motives, resources etc. What most theories do not take into account is that especially in 
developing countries also host country governments play an important role in controlling FDI.
In the theoretical framework of this study I have combined both the perspectives of the 
company (and the prospective JV partner company) and the host country government and the 
host country environment. I have used this framework to describe how foreign companies'
83
entry mode choices in China have changed over time in a situation where a previously closed 
economy opens for foreign investment and gradually allows more freedom for foreign 
investors.
Managerial Implications
The experiences of other companies are valuable reading when planning operations in a foreign 
country. The case descriptions in this study show howr changing environment and legislation in 
China affected the entry mode decisions of foreign companies in the late 1990’s, and thus offer 
important background information to companies planning to invest in China. Drawing on the 
case studies one can conclude the following:
1. China is a difficult market where patience is required and where most foreign companies 
go w ith too high expectations in terms of profits and too optimistic schedules.
2. The key success factor is "how to sell to Chinese customers"’.
3. A company should not choose the jouit venture form only to acquire local know-how. Joint 
venture should not be chosen unless it can be clearly defined in detail what is the 
contribution that the partner would bring to the venture.
4. Nowadays foreign companies, even those without earlier experience, can manage without 
Chinese partners. But they have to do their homework and plans well and hire local people.
Suggestions for Further Research
Wholly owned subsidiaries are a relatively new phenomenon in China, and therefore much 
remains to be studied. What are the success factors of WFOEs in China? What are the most 
common problems? Especially interesting research area would be organisational issues and 
human resource management in WFOEs m China. Also, the market and the regulations in 
China continue to change at a fast pace, therefore more research on foreign companies’ entry 
strategies is justified.
In addition, although joint ventures in China have been studied widely, the topic is still timely 
because the environment and the nature of JVs is changing. What kind of companies still 
establish joint ventures in China today? For what purpose? Flow' are they structured?
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APPENDIX 1
Contributions of FDI то China’s Economy, 1991-1997
Item 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
FDI inflows ($ bil) 4,4 11,2 27,5 33.8 35.8 40,8 45,8
Average amount per 
project ($ mil)
0,9 1.2 1,3 1.8 2.5 na na
FDI/gross domenstic 
investment (%)
3,9 7.4 12.7 17,3 15.1 17.0 14.8
FDI stock/GDP (%) 5,6 7.1 10,2 17,6 18,8 24.7 na
FIE exports ($bil) 12.0 17,4 25.2 34,7 46,9 61.5 75.0
FŒ exports/national 
exports (%)
17,0 20.4 27,5 28,7 31,3 41,0 41.0
FIE output/national 
output (%)
5.0 6.0 9,0 11,0 13.0 na 18.6
Number of employees 
(mil)
4.8 6.0 10.0 14,0 16,0 17,0 17.5
Tax contribution as a 
share of total
na 4.1 na na 10.0 na 13,2
Adapted from UNCTAD (1998).
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APPENDIX 2
Case Interview Outline
1. Basic company information
2. International operations of the case company
3. Company history in Cliina / other business units in China.
4. What were the motivations for investing in China?
5. Basic data of the wholly owned subsidiary' (the case unit) in China.
How did the establishing process proceed?
6. What were the reasons for choosing the wholly owned mode?
Was joint venture considered? Why it was not chosen?
7. The role of Chinese officials in the entry mode choice and the operations of the unit.
8. Local know-how and guanxi.
9. Human resources of the unit.
10. Present situation:
How the operations have developed?
Turnover and profitability
What kind of problems the company has experienced?
11. Future:
Future prospects, both operational and financial 
The effects of WTO
12. Entry modes in China in general:
What do you see as the most important reasons for the increase of wholly owned subsidiaries 
in China?
What are the challenges/advantages/disadvantages of a wholly owned subsidiary/joint venture? 
What will happen in the future? Is the era of JVs in China over?
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APPENDIX 3
Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries
(Source: Shanghai Foreign Investment Commision: www.investment.gov.cn.)
Approved by the State Council on December 29, 1997, and promulgated by the State Planning Commission, the State Economic and Trade 
Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation on December 31,1997.
Encouraged Foreign Investment Industries
I Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry, Fishery and Related Industries
1. Reclaiming and development of wasteland, waste mountain, inter-tidal zone (except those with military facilities), as well as 
improvement of low-and medium- yielding field
2. Development of new varieties of fine quality, high-yielding crops such as sugar-yielding crops, fruit trees, vegetables, flowers 
and plants, forage grass and related new techniques
3. Serialization production of soilless cultivation of vegetables, flowers and plants
4. Planting of forest trees and introduction of fine strains of forest trees
5. Breeding of good strains of domestic animals, fowls and aquatic fmgerlings (not including special, precious good strains of our 
country)
6. Breeding of famous, special and fine aquatic products
7. New varieties of effective and safe agricultural chemicals and pesticides (over 80 percent insect death rate, safe to people, 
animals and crops)
8. High-density fertilizers (potash fertilizer, phosphate fertilizer)
9. New technologies for the production of agricultural films, and development of new products (fiber film, photolysis film, multi­
functional film and raw materials)
10. Antibiotic material medicals (including antibiotic and chemical synthesis)
11. New products or new forms of anthelmintic, insecticide, anti-coccidiosis mediernes used for animals
12. Development of feed additive, and feed protein resources
13. New technology and equipment for the storage, preservation drying and processing of food, vegetables, fruits, meat products, 
and aquatic products
14. Forestry chemicals and new technology and products for the comprehensive utilization of "sub-quality, small and firewood" 
lumber and bantbod in the forest area
15. Construction and management of key water control projects for comprehensive utilization (The Chinese party will be the 
holding party or play a leading role.)
16. Manufacture of new type water-saving irrigation technical equipment
17. Manufacture of new technical agricultural machinery
18. Improvement and construction of ecological environment
II Light Industry
1. Design, processing, and manufacture of molds for non-metal products
2. Paper pulp (with an annual production capacity of over 170 thousand tons of pulp and a related raw material base)
3. Post ornament and processing of leather and related new-tech equipment
4. Production of non-mercury alkali-manganese secondary battery and lithium- ion battery
5. Manufacturing of high-tech involved special industrial sewing machines
6. Production of polyamide film
7. Production of new- type, highly efficient enzymic preparations
8. Production of synthetic spices, single ion spices
9. Research and popularization of the applied technology of freon substitution
10. Production of diacetate for cigarette making and processing of tows
III Textile Industry
1. Production of wood pulp for textile chemical fiber (construction of raw material base with an annual output capacity of over 100 
thousand tons)
2. Special textiles for industrial use
3. Printing and dyeing as well as post processing of high emulation chemical fiber plus material
4. Production of assistant, grease, and dye-stuff for textile
IV Communication and Transportation as well as Post & Telecommunications Services
1. Technical equipment for railway transportation: the design and manufacture of locomotives and mam parts, the design and 
manufacture of line facility and equipment, related technology and equipment manufacture for rapid transit railway, manufacture 
of equipment for communicational signals and transportation safety monitoring, manufacture of electric railway equipment and 
instruments
2. Construction and management of feeder railways, local railways, and related bridges, tunnels, and ferry facilities (wholly foreign 
owned enterprises are not allowed)
3. Design and manufacture of new-type mechanical equipment for highway and port and related designing and manufacturing 
technologies
4. Construction and management of city subway and light rail (The Chinese party will be the holding party or play a leading role)
5. Construction and management of highways, independent bridges and tunnels, and port facilities (for public wharfs, and the Chinese 
party will be the holding party or play a leading role)
6. Construction and management of public dock facilities of ports (the Chinese party will be the holding party and play a leading 
role)
7. Construction and management of civil airport (the Chinese party will be the holding party or play a leading role)
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8. Production of the equipment of DCS/CDMA
9. Production of digital serial transmission equipment of photo-timing and micro-wave synchronization of 5 GB/S or above
10. Production of metering devices of 2-5 GB/S for photo communication, wireless communication and data communication
11. Production of AMT exchange boards
V Coal Industry
1. Design and manufacture of coal mining, conveyance and concentration equipment
2. Coal's mining and ore-dressing by washing the Chútese party will be the holding party or play a leading role in the mining and 
ore-dressing by washing of special and rare kinds of coal)
3. Production of water-coal and liquefied coal
4. Comprehensive development and utilization of coal
5. Comprehensive development and utilization of low-thermal-value fuel and associated resources
6. Pipe-transportation of coal
7. Exploration and development of coal bed gas
VI Power Industry
1. Construction and management of heat power station with a smgle machine's installed-capacity of 100 thousand kilowatts or above
2. Construction and management of hydropower station with the main purpose of power generatmg
3. Construction and management of nuclear power station (the Chinese party will be the holdmg party or play a leadmg role)
4. Construction and management of power station with the technology of clean coal burnmg
5. Construction and management of new energy power station (including solar energy, wind energy, magnetic energy, geothermal 
energy, tide energy and biological mass energy, etc.)
VII Ferrous Metallurgical Industry
1. 50 ton or above super-high power electric furnace (equipped with the ability of external refining and continuous casting) and 50 
ton or above converter steel-making
2. Smelting of stainless steel
3. Production of cold-rolled silicon steel tape
4. Production of hot-rolled and cold-rolled stainless steel plate
5. Steel pipeline for transmitting petroleum
6. Processing and treatment of steel scrap
7. Extraction and selection of non and manganese ores
8. Production of direct reducted iron and retailored iron
9. High alumina vitriol earth, hard clay mining and grog production
10. Deep processing of needle coke, hard coke and coal tar
11. Production of dry coke quenching
VIII Non-Ferrous Metal Industry
1. Production or mono-crystalline silicon (with a diameter of & inches or over) multi-crystalline silicon
2. Production of hard alloy, tin compound, and antimony compound
3. Production of non-ferrous composite materials, new type alloy materials
4. Copper, lead, tin mining (wholly foreign owned enterprises are not allowed)
5. Aluminum mining (wholly foreign owned enterprises are not allowed) and alumina (3,000, 000 tons or more a year)
6. Rarerearth application
IX Petroleum. Petrochemical and Chemistry Industries
1. Manufacture of ion film for caustic soda
2. Ethylene (with an annual production capacity of 600, 000 tons or over, and the Chinese party will be the holding party or play a 
leading role)
3. Corvic (the Chinese party will be the holdmg party or play a leadmg role)
4. Comprehensive utilization of ethylene side-products such as C5 - C9.
5. Engineering plastics and plastic alloys
6. Supporting raw materials for synthesized materials (bisphenol-A, butadienestyrene latex, pyridme, 4.4' diphenyhnethane, diiso­
cyan ester, and vulcabond toluene)
7. Comprehensive utilization of basic organic chemical raw materials: the derivatives of benzene, methylbenzene, (para-, ortho-, or 
meta-) dimethylobenzene
8. Synthetic rubber (liquid butadiene styrene rubber by butadiene method, butyl rubber, isoamyl rubber, ethyl rubber, butadiene 
neoprene rubber, butadiene rubber, acrylic rubber, chlorophydrin rubber)
9. Fme chemistry: new products and technology for dye-stuff, mtermediate, catalytic agent, auxiliary, and pigment; processing 
technology for the commercialization of dye (pigment); electronics and high-tech chemicals for paper-making, food additives, feed 
additives, leather chemical products, oil-well auxiliaries, surface active agent, water treatment agent, adhesives, inorganic fiber, 
inorganic powder stuffing and equipment
10. Chloridized titanium dioxide
11. Production of chemical products using coal as raw material
12. Comprehensive utilization of exhaust gas, discharge liquid, waste slag
13. Production of dépurant of automobile tail gas; catalytic agent and other assistant
14. Development and utilization of tertiary oil recovery which can mcrease the recovery ratio of petroleum (the Chinese party will be 
the holding party or play a leading role)
15. Construction and management of oil and gas delivery pipes, as well as oil depot and oil wharf (the Chinese party will be the 
holding party or play a leadmg role)
X Mechanical Industry
1. Manufacture of high performance welding robot and effective weldmg and assembling production fine
2. High temperature resistant insulation material (with F, H insulation class) and mould casted insulation products
3. Manufacture of equipment for mining, loadmg and transporting in the well, 100 or over tons of mechanical power-driven dump 
trucks for mining, mobil crushers, double input and output coal grinder, 3, 000m3/h or over bucket excavator, 5m3 or larger 
mining loader, full-face tunneling machines
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4. Manufacture of multi-color offset press for web and folio or paper of larger size
5. Manufacture of cleaning equipment for electro-mechanical wells and production of medicals
6. Manufacture of turbine compressor and combined powder machine for the complete set of equipment for an annual production of 
300, 000 tons or over of synthetic ammonia, 480, 00 tons or over of urea. 300, 000 tons or over of synthetic ammonia, 300, 000 
tons or over of ethylene
7. Manufacture of complete set of equipment of new type of knitting machine, new type of paper (including pulp) making machine
8. Development and manufacture of precision on-line measuring instrument
9. Manufacture of new technical equipment for safe production and environment protection detecting instruments
10. New type of meters' spare parts and materials (mainly new switches and function materials for meters such as intelligent sensors, 
electrical adapters, flexible circuit plate, photoelectric switches, and proximity switch, and so on)
11. Research, design and development center of important basic machinery, basic parts and important technical equipment
12. Development of proportional, servo-hydraulic technology and production of low-power pneumatic control valve and stuffing static 
seal.
13. Production of precision trimming dies, precision cavity modes and matrix standard components
14. Manufacture of 250, 000 tons/day city sewage-disposal equipment, industrial sewage film treatment equipment, up-flow 
anaerobic fluidized bed equipment and other biological sewage disposal equipment, slab making equipment of powder coal ash (5- 
10 tons/year), recycling equipment for waste plastics, equipment for desulphurization and denitration equipment of industrial 
tuiler, large high-temperature resistant, acid resistant bag dust remover
15. Manufacture of precision bearings and all kinds of bearings used
16. Manufacture of key spare parts for cars: complete brakes, complete driving rods, gearbox, steering knuckle, fuel pump of diesel 
engine, piston (including pistoning), valve, hydraulic tappet, axle bush, bcoster, filter (3 filtering), even speed cardan joint, shock 
absorber, seat adjustor, car lock, backview mirror, glass lifter, compound meter, light, bulb, car fastener
17. Manufacture of car and motorcycle molds (including strike moulds, plastics filling moulds, mould-pressing moulds, etc.) and 
clippers (welding clipper, testing clippers, etc. )
18. Production of casted and forged semifinished products for cars and motorcycles
19. Car and motorcycle technology research center, and design and development institute
20. Cars for special purposes such as desert cars for petroleum industry
21. Production of key spare parts for motorcycles: carburetors, magneters, starting motors, lamps, disc brakes
22. Manufacture of new-tech equipment of water quality on-line detecting instrument
23. Manufacture of special machines and equipment for flood prevention and emergency rescue
24. Manufacture of earth - movers for wet land and desilting machines
25. Manufacture of integrated equipment with a feed processing capacity of 10 tons or more an hour, and the production of spare parts
26. Design and manufacture of new instruments and equipment for petroleum exploration and development
XI Electronic Industry
1. Large scale production of integrated circuit with a line width of 0.35 micron or a smaller line width
2. New type electronic spare parts (including slice spare parts) and electric and electronic spare parts
3. Manufacture of photoelectric components, sensitive components and sensors
4. Manufacture of large and medium sized computers
5. Manufacture of compatible digital TV, HDTV, digital video tape recorder and player
6. Development of semi-conductor, photo electronic materials
7. Manufacture of new type displays (plate displays and displaying screens)
8. Development of 3-dimension CAD, CAT, CAM, CAE and other computer application systems
9. Manufacture of special electronic equipment, instruments, and industrial mould
10. Manufacture of hydrological data collection instrument and equipment
11. Manufacture of equipment of satellite communication
12. Manufacture of digital cross-linking equipment
13. Manufacture of air traffic control equipment (wholly foreign owned enterprises are not allowed)
14. Development and manufacture of high-capacity mass storage of laser-disks, disks and parts.
15. Development and manufacture of new type printing devices (laser-printers, etc.)
16. Manufacture of equipment of multi-media system of data communication
17. Production of single mode optical fiber
18. Manufacture of equipment for cut-in communication system
19. New technical equipment supporting communication network
20. Manufacture of ISDN.
XII Building Materials, Equipment and Other Non-metal Mineral Product Industries
1. Production line of fine-quality floating glass with a daily melting capacity of 500 tons or over
2. Production line of high level sanitation porcelain with an annual production of 500, 000 pieces as well as auxiliary hardware parts 
and plastic parts
3. New building materials (materials for wall, decorating and finishing materials, water-proof materials, and thermal insulation 
materials)
4. Production line of new type dry process cement of clinker with a daily output capacity of 4, 000 tons or more (only in the mid-west 
region of this country)
5. Bulk cement storage and transportation facilities
6. Production line of glass fiber (through direct melting process) and glass fiber reinforced plastics with and annual capacity of 10, 
000 tons or more
7. Manufacture of non-organic, non-metal materials and products (quartz glass, artificial crystal)
8. Production of high-class refractory material used in furnaces for glass, ceramics and glass fiber
9. Deep processing technique and equipment of plate glass
10. Manufacture of tunneling machine, equipment for covered digging of city metro
11. Manufacture of special equipment for cities' sanitation work
12. Manufacture of tree transplanters
13. Manufacture of machines for road planning and repairing
XIII Medicine Industry
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1. Chemical medicines under patent and administrative protection in our country, medical intermediate specially used in medicine 
which we have to import
2. Analgesic-antipyretic which has to be produced through new technical equipment
3. Vitamins: niacin
4. New type of anticarcinogen and cardio-vascular and cerebrovascula mediernes
5. Medicines and pharmaceutics: new products and new forms of drug produced by means of slow release, control release, target 
preparation and those absorbed through skins
6. Amino acid: serine, tryptophan, histidine, etc.
7. Wrapping materials and containers for new medicines and other advanced pharmaceutical equipment
8. New, effective and economical contraceptive medicines and devices
9. New technology, equipment and instruments that control the quality of traditional Chinese medicine and change tire packaging
10. New analytical and extraction technology and equipment of the effective part of traditional Chinese medicine
11. New medicines which are produced by means of biological engineering technology
12. Development and utilization of new type adjuvant
13. Production of diagnosis reagent for hepatitis, AIDS, and radio-immunity diseases
XIV Medical Equipment Industry
1. Medical X-ray machine set with medium-frequency technique, computer control technique, and digital imagery processing 
technique
2. Electronic endoscope
3. Tubes for medical use
XV AeroSpace Industry
1. Design and manufacture of civil planes (tire Chinese party will be the holding party or play a leading role)
2. Manufacture of spare parts for civil planes
3. Design and manufacture of airplane engines (the Chinese party will be the holding party or play a leading role)
4. Manufacture of air-borne equipment
5. Manufacture of light gas turbine engine
6. Design and manufacture of civil satellites (the Chinese party will be the holding party or play a leading role)
7. 7,Manufacture of civil satellite payload (the Chinese party will be the holding party or play a leading role)
8. Manufacture of spare parts for civil satellites
9. Development oftlie application technique of civil satellites
10. Design and manufacture of civil carrier rockets (the Chinese party will be the holding party or play a leading role)
XVI New Industries
1. Microelectronic technology
2. New materials
3. Biological engineering techniques (not including genetic engineering)
4. Network techniques of information, communications systems
5. Isotopic irradiation and laser techniques
6. Ocean and ocean energy development technology
7. Seawater desalting and seawater utilization technology
8. Development of energy-saving technology
9. Technology for recycling and comprehensive utilization of resources
10. Projects for improving polluted environment and related monitoring and improving technology
XVII Service Business
1. Information Consultation about information of international economy, science & technology and environmental protection
2. Maintenance of precision instruments and equipment, service after sales
3. Construction of new and high technology and building of new product developing center as well as incubation of enterprises
XVIII Permitted projects whose products are to be wholly exported directly
Restricted Foreign Investment Industries
(A)
I Light Industry
1. Production of washing machines, refrigerators, freezers
2. Production of synthetic emtrol, alcohol ether and alcohol ether sulfate
3. Manufacture of compressors with a shaft power of 2 kw or less which are specially used for air-conditioners and refrigerators.
II Textile Industry
1. Chemical fiber drawnwork of conventional chipper
2. Production of viscose staple fiber with an annual single thread output capacity of less than 20, 000 tons
III Petroleum, Petrochemical, Chemical Industries
1. Barium salt production
2. Refinery with an output capacity of less than 5 million tons a year
3. Cross-ply and old tire reconditions (not including radial tire)
4. Production of sulphuric acid basic titanium white
IV Machinery Industry
1. Manufacture of equipment for producing long dacron thread and short fiber
2. Manufacture of power generating units of diesel engines
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3. Production of all kinds of ordinary abrasives (containing boule and silicon-carbide), grindstone with a diameter of less titan 400 
nun and man-nade diamond saw bit
4. Production of electric drill and electric grinder
5. Ordinary carbon steel welding rod
6. Ordinary standard fasteners, small and medium sized ordinary bearings
7. Ordinary lead acid accumulator
8. Containers
9. Elevators
10. Aluferhub
V Electronics Industry
1. Satellite television receiver and key parts
2. Exchange boards for the use of digital program-control bureau and for the use of private branch exchange
VI Medicine Industry
1. Production of chloramphenicol, lineomycin, gentamicin, dihydrostreptomycin, amikacin, tetracycline hydrochloride, 
Oxytetracycline, acetyl spiramycin, medemycin, kitasamycin, ilotycin, norfloxacinum and ofloxacin
2. Production of Analgin, aspirin, paracetamol. Vitamin Bl, Vitamin B2 and Vitamin B6
VII Medical Apparatus and Instruments
1, Production of low or medium class type-B ultrasonic displays
VIII Transportation Service
1. Taxi (The purchase of cars is restricted within China)
2. Gas station (restricted to projects related to super highway)
(B)
I Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry. Fishery and Related Industries
1. Development and production of food, cotton and oil-seed (the Chinese part will be tire holding party or play a leading role)
2. Processing and export of the logs of precious varieties of trees (wholly foreign owned enterprises are not allowed)
3. Inshore and continental-river fishing (wholly foreign owned enterprises are not allowed)
4. Cultivation of traditional Chinese medicines (wholly foreign owned enterprises are not allowed)
II Light Industry
1. Product of table salt, and salt for industrial use
2. Production of non-alcoholic beverage of foreign brand (including solid beverage)
3. Production of mille wine and famous brands of spirits
4. Tobacco processing industries such as cigarettes and filter tips
5. Processing and production of blue wet hide of pig, cow and sheep
6. Production of natural spices
7. Processing of fat or oil
8. Paper and paper plate
III Textile industry
1. Wool spinning, cotton spinning
2. Raw silk, gray silk fabric
3. Highly emulated chemical fiber and special kinds of fiber such as aromatic synthetic fiber, and carbon fiber (wholly foreign owned 
enterprises are not allowed)
4. Fiber and polyester, acrylic fiber and spandex which are not used as fiber (wholly foreign owned enterprises are not allowed)
IV Communication and Transportation, Post and Telecommunications Industries
1. Construction and management of main lines of railways (the Chinese party will be the holding party or take a leading role)
2. Transportation by water (the Chinese party will be the holding party and take a leading role)
3. Entry and exit automobile transportation (wholly foreigner owned enterprises are not allowed)
4. 4. Air freiglit (the Chinese party will be the holding party or play a leading role)
5. General aviation (the Chinese party will be the holding party or play a leading role)
V Power Industry
1. Construction and management of conventional coal-fired power plants whose single-machine capacity is less tilan 300, 000 kw 
(with the exception of small power grid, power plants in remote area and power plants of low-quality coal and coal refuses)
VI Non-ferrous Metal Industry (wholly foreign owned enterprises are not allowed)
1. Copper and aluminum processing
2. Mining, dressing, smelting, and processing of precious metals (gold, silver, platinum families)
3. Mining of non-ferrous metals such as wolfram, tin and antimony
4. Exploration, mining, selection, smelting and separation of rare-earth metal
VII Petroleum, Petrochemical Industry and Chemical Industry
1. Sensitive materials (cartridge, film, PS plate, and photographic paper)
2. Mining and processing of baron, magnesium, iron ores
3. Benzidine
4. 4.Chemical industry products such as ionic membrane caustic soda and organochlorine serial products
5. Radial tire (the Chinese party will be the holding party or play a leading role)
6. Synthetic fiber raw materials: precision terephthalic acid, vinyl cyanide, caprolactam and nylon 66 salt
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VIII Mechanical Industry
1. Complete automobiles (including limousines, trucks, passenger cars, and reeuipped cars) and complete motorcycles (the 
Chinese party will be the holding party and take a leading role)
2. Engines of automobiles and motorcycles (the Chinese party will be the holding party or take a leading role)
3. Production of compressors of air conditioners for cars, electron-controlled fuel-oil injecting systems, electronic controlled brake 
and locking-prevention systems, safety aerocysts and other electronic equipment, power generating machines and aluminum 
radiating machines
4. Reconditioning and disassembling refitting of old cars and motorcycles
5. Fire power equipment: (power unit,, turbine, boiler, supplementary machine and controlling equipment) manufacture of units of 
over 100, OOOkw, gas turbine combined cycle power equipments, cyclic fluidized bed boiler, coal gasification combined cyclic 
technique and equipment ( IGCC), pressure boost fluidized bed ( PFBC), desulfurization and denitrification equipment (wholly 
foreign owned enterprises are not allowed)
6. Hydroelectric equipment: manufacture of hydropower generating units with a wheel diameter of over 5 meters (including 
hydropower supplementary machines and controlling units), large scale pump storage groups of over 50,OOOkw, large scale 
tubular turbine units of 10, 000 kw or over ( wholly foreign owned enterprises are not allowed)
7. Nuclear power group: manufacture of nuclear power groups of 600, OOOkw or over (wholly foreign owned enterprises are not 
allowed)
8. Manufacture of power transmitting and transforming equipment: large scale transformers of 200 kilovolts or over high-voltage 
switches, mutual ¡inductor, cable equipment (wholly foreign owned enterprises are not allowed)
9. Manufacture of crawler dozers of less than 320 horsepower, wheeled foik-lift of less titan 3 cubic meters, and cranes of less than 
50 tons (wholly foreign owned enterprises are not allowed)
10. Manufacture of sheet continuous caster
11. Duplicators and cameras
IN Electronic Industry
1. Color TV (including projestion television), color picture tube and glass envelope
2. 2Video cameras (including camera-recorder in one unit)
3. Video recorders and magnetic heads, magnetic drums and movements of video recorder
4. Analogue type mobile communications systems (honey-comb, colony, wireless beeper call, wireless telephone)
5. Receiving equipment of satellite navigation and key parts (wholly foreign owned enterprises are not allowed)
6. Manufacture of the system of VSAT
7. Manufacture of photo-tuning digital serial communication systems of less than 2.5 GB/S and microwave communication 
systems of 144MB/S and lower
X Building Material Equipment and Other Non-metal Product Industries Exploration, mining and processing of diamond and other natural 
gems (wholly foreign owned enterprises are not allowed)
XI Medicine Industry
1. Traditional Chinese herb medicines, Chinese patent drug semis and finished products with the exception of preparing technique 
of traditional Chinese herb medicine in small pieces ready for decoction)
2. Precursor of narcotics: ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, ergotinine, ergotamine, lysergic acid and so on
3. Penicillin G
4. Production of addiction narcotic and psychoactive drug (the Chinese party will be tire holding party or play a leading role)
5. Production of vaccinums that involve high tech: vaccinum against AIDS, vaccinum against type-C hepatitis, contraceptive 
vaccimum and so on (the Chinese party will be the holding party or play a leadig role)
6. Immunity vaccinums included in the State's plan, bacterins, antitoxins and anatoxin (BCG vaccine, poliomyelitis, DPT 
vaccine, measles vaccine, Type-В encephalitis, epidemic cerebrospinal meningitis vaccine
7. Production of Vitamin
8. Production of blood products
XII Medical Apparatus and Instruments Industry
1. Disposable injectors, transfusion systems, blood transfiision systems and blcod bags
2. Manufacture of large medical treatment equipment such as CT, MRI and accelerators for medical use
XIII Shipping Industry (the Chinese party will be the holding party or play a leading role)
1. Repairing, design and manufacture of special ships, high performance ships and over 35, 000-ton ships
2. Design and manufacture of diesel engines for ships, auxiliary machines, wireless communication, navigation equipment and parts
XIV Domestic and Foreign Trade, Tourism, Real Estate and Service Industry (wholly foreign owned enterprises are not allowed)
1. Domestic commerce (the Chinese party will be the holding party or play a leading role)
2. Foreign trade (tite Chinese party will be the holding party or play a leading role)
3. Tourist agencies
4. Cooperative school-running (with the exception of elementary education)
5. Medical establishments (the Chinese party will be the holding party or play a leading role)
6. Accounting, audit and legal consultation services and agent company
7. Agent services (boats and ships, freight, futures, sales, advertisement, etc. )
8. High-ranking hotels, villas, high-class office buildings, and international exhibition centers
9. Golf links
10. Development of pieces of land
11. Large scale tourist, cultural and recreational parks and artificial landscapes
12. Construction and management of State-ranking tourist areas
XV Finance and Relevant Trades
1. Banks, finance companies and trust investment companies
2. Insurance companies, insurance brokerages and underwriting agent companies
3. Bond companies, investment banks, merchant banks, fund management companies
4. Financial lease
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5. Foreign exchange brokerages
6. Financial, insurance and foreign exchange consultation
7. Production, processing, wholesales and retail of gold, silver, gems, and jewelry
XVI Miscellaneous
1. Printing, publishing and issuing business (the Chinese party will be the holding party or play a leading role)
2. Testing, appraising and attestation business of import and export goods (wholly foreign owned enterprises are not allowed)
3. Production, publications and issuing of audio and video products and electronic publications (the Chinese party will be the holding 
party or play a leading role)
XVII Other industries Restricted by the State or International Treaties that China Has Concluded or Taken Part in
Proliibited Foreign Investment Industries
I Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry, Fishery and Related Industries
1. Wild animal and plant resources protected by the State
2. China's rare precious breeds (including fine genes in plants industry, husbandry and aquatic products industry)
3. Construction of animal and plant natural reserves
4. Processing of green tea and specialties (famous teas, dark tea, etc.)
II Light Industry
1. Ivory carving and tiger-bone processing
2. Hand-made carpet
3. Bodiless lacquerware
4. Enamel products
5. Blue and white porcelain
6. Xuan paper' and ingot-shaped tablets of Chinese ink
III Power Industry and Urban Public Utility
1. Construction and management of electricity network
2. Construction and management of urban networks of water supply, water drainage, gas and heat power
III Exploration. Selection, or Processing of Mining Industry
1. Exploration, selection, smelting or processing of radioactive mineral products
2. Petroleum Industry, Petrochemical Industry and Chemical Industry
3. Mining and processing of szaibelyite
4. Mining and processing of celestine
IV Medicine Industry
1. Traditional Chinese medicines, which have been listed as State protection resources (musk, licorice root etc.)
2. Preparing technique of traditional Chinese medicine in small pieces ready for decoction and products of secret recipe of 
traditional Chinese medicine already prepared
V Transportation and Post & Telecommunications Services
1. Management of post and telecommunications business
2. Air traffic control
VI Trade and Finance
1. Commodity future, financial future and related finance business
VII Broadcasting and Film Industries
1. Broadcasting stations, TV stations (networks) at various levels, launching stations and relay stations
2. Production, publishing, or issuing of broadcasting and TV programs
3. Production, publishing, issuing or showing of films
4. Video tape showing
VIII Journalism
IX Manufacturing Industry of Weapons
X Miscellaneous
1. Projects that endanger the safety and performance of military facilities
2. Developing and processing of carcinogenic, teratogenic, and mutagenesis raw materials
3. Racecourse, gambling
4. Pornographic service
XI Other Industries Prohibited by the State or by International treaties China Has Concluded or Taken Part hi
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